Integrating before restructuring

The exercise to restructure the decision-making process in the MoD must, therefore, be preceded by a comprehensive Strategic Defence Review SDRwhich looks at India and its security in the decades to come from the perspective of evolving threats, technologies, societies, environmental and atmospheric opportunities and hazards, and above all, in the ultimate analysis, the need for enhancing the living standards of the Indian citizen.

The SDR must, without an iota of doubt, precede the restructuring process for the endeavour to be futuristic and unpartisan. An SDR that is unpartisan in its output will analyse the emerging and likely threats across the bo-ard, and recommend possible responses. Th-at these suggested responses are likely to include restructuring op- tions in the larger field of governmental decision-making is well nigh certain.

After all, an SDR is not just the responsibility of the MoD, but the entire Government of India. It only makes sense that the restructuring exercise in South Block ke-ep the SDR recommendations in mind. There is little rationale for taking some half-steps now, and then attempting to complete the journeysubsequently. In the system and culture of governance prevailing in this country, it is unlikely that another chance will come in the near future.

The rationale behind any restructuring exercise concerning the MoD must be motivated by one simple principle to improve the efficiency and combat effectiveness of the armed forces. Governed by that motive any restructuring exercise will then conclude as to which functions should come under the purview of the armed forces and those that will continue to be of civilian concern and responsibility.

To defy the conventional it is safe to say that all matters relating to manpower policies, promotions and otherwise, sho-uld be the sole responsibility of the armed forces. This issue would face the widest possible opposition from the larger edifice of the government, but it is the only option left for the Union of India if it wants to get its armed forces out of the loop of manipulative actions by the leaderships of all hues.

Even as the armed forces headquartersconduct the promotion boards within their structures, an under secretary in the MoD can change all that with the stroke of a pen. An honourable way out of this mess is for the executive authority in the MoD, the Raksha or the Rajya Raksha Mantri, to sit on in the special promotion boards. The armed forces have hitherto never allowed anybody from outside their service to participate in such boards, and a common refrain from the civilian bureaucracy is that the armed forces cannot be allowed to exercise sole control over their cadres.

The participation by the political authority of the MoD in special promotion boards will open up the procedures to greater scrutiny and transparency. If anything, a large number of military officers themselves doubt the transparency of the boards. Without allowing for the practice to be done away with in its entirety, the armed forces must include the political leadership in the proceedings of the boards.

While it takes care of the civil service charge that such matters cannotbe handled only within, it also eases apprehensions of the armed forces officers that favouritism prevails in the selection procedures. Opening up the boards to participation by the political leadership is the best way to have a civil-military interface whilst instilling greater transparency in the procedures.

The other significant compromise that the armed forces must be willing to make is over the issue of integration. Even as an SDR will make much mention of integration, the MoD restructuring exercise will be premature as well as incomplete if it were to precede the integration of the armed forces. To go back to May 11 amp; 13 and the RMA that preceded the tests, the creation of a credible nuclear deterrent as well as the rapid changes underway in military matters, the continuation of certain armed forces formations and institutions has become untenable.

In an age of austerity and value for money the armed forces have to look at every possible option at making savings. To, then, take the suggestion to itslogical end, the armed forces must integrate, at the fighting formation, as well as training levels. This is the surest way to saving monies as well as enhancing combat efficiency.

Anybody who thinks that the next conventional conflict can be fought with each service doing its own thing is typecast for a Battle of Britain role. For that matter even the unconventional war scenarios tend to be multi-service; but that India continues to fight its conflicts through a parochial prism is a reflection of the malaise. No amount of restructuring is going to alter that, only integration down to the combatants level.