Yen for change

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori was in India from August 21 to 25. Any assessment of the significance or prospects of Indo-Japanese r...

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori was in India from August 21 to 25. Any assessment of the significance or prospects of Indo-Japanese relations should be made within the ambit of Japan8217;s world vision. Japan has had to redefine the terms of reference of its foreign and strategic policies at the end of the Cold War, specially in the context of the detente between the USA and the Russian Federation, the substantive expansion of US-China relations, and the success of the Chinese experiment in economic liberalisation.

India8217;s priority in Japanese foreign policy is determined by these factors. We are not Japan8217;s primary area of political, strategic or security attention. We have, perhaps, a higher priority in the Japanese scheme of things in selective areas of technology and exports and to a lesser extent as a market for investment. We must also remember that Japan continues to distinguish between South-East Asia and South-West Asia. The former unidimensional focus on South East Asia is gradually undergoing change because of India8217;s economic reforms. Japan increasingly acknowledges the potentialities of Indo-Japanese economic relations for mutual benefit. But this acknowledgement does not transcend Japan8217;s basic assessment that therelations can achieve their full potential only if India falls in line with the broader strategic economic and technological orientations of the advanced democracies of the world that constitute the Group of 7, though cosmetically Russia is also an additional member of the group.

This was the first visit by a Japanese prime minister to India after a gap of nearly a decade. It is also the first visit after India8217;s nuclear weapons tests of 1998. Notwithstanding the fact that Japan remains profoundly critical of the nuclear weaponisation of the subcontinent, Mori8217;s coming to India perhaps signals the fact that Japan is willing to deal with India on a more practical basis, acknowledging the realities of India8217;s security concerns, political motivations and evolving technological capacities. His visit indicates Japan8217;s inclination to get down from the high political horseof its condemnatory political stance against India during the first year or so after the Shakti series of tests at Pokharan in May 1998.

The decisions taken and agreements reached during Mori8217;s visit must necessarily be seen in the context of some substantive aspects of Indo-Japanese relations. Japan used to be the largest donor of aid to India during the decade of the 90s of the last century, averaging half a billion dollars per annum. This assistance was totally choked off in retaliation to India8217;s nuclear weapon tests. The end of the Cold War and India8217;s improved ties with the US created a positive atmosphere for Indo-Japanese relations. Since 1992, about 215 Japanese companies are operating in India. Most of them are trading companies with the total volume of trade between the two countries estimated at Rs 18,000 crore.

In comparative terms, Indo-Japanese commercial relations remain a marginal phenomenon in the overall bilateral trade activities of both countries, Japanaccounting for about six per cent of India8217;s external trade and India for only 0.05 per cent of Japan8217;s external trade. Direct investment from Japan, the important example of Maruti underpinned by Suzuki, and Toyota, Honda, and Mitsubishi commencing their operations in India, the total value of investment from Japan is only around Rs 2,500 crore 8212; less than one-third oftotal Japanese projects of investment in India, the approved value of which is Rs 9,000 crore.

The emerging picture is of both India and Japan being convinced about thepotential for more substantive bilateral relations, in the technological and economic fields. But Japan still has some political conditionalities and economic inhibitions about India and the efficiency and speed of economic reforms. India feels that Japan is not fully responsive to India8217;s desire forenhanced multi-faceted bilateral cooperation.

During his visit to Bangalore, Mori suggested institutionalised cooperation in the Information Technology Sector between India and Japan. In Delhi, he stressed the importance of technological cooperation. While direct Japanese aid would remain suspended till India signs CTBT, there are reports that Japan may remove some of the restrictions on assistance and flows of investment and technology to some of the projects in the pipeline, the Delhi metro railway project and the Simhadri power project in Andhra Pradesh.

Story continues below this ad

Overall, Japan seems to realise that economic and technological sanctions are not going to make India compromise on its security interests and that India remains an attractive economic partner, not to be neglected for impracticable political considerations. India, on the other hand, has shown its continuing interest in economic partnership with Japan. The primacy of amutuality of interest in a strong economic relationship is not denied, but this must be underpinned by a mutuality of political and security interests.

Japan continues to insist that India must sign the CTBT and accept international regimes on non-proliferation. Mori chaired the G-8 summit at Okinewa in July. The Okinewa statement on regional issues said: 8220;The level of tensions between India and Pakistan remains a cause of international concern. We call on the two countries to resume dialogue as soon as possible in the spirit of Lahore in order to realise sustainable peace in the region. We call on both India and Pakistan to join international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. While welcoming those positive statements and steps that have been made, we reiterate our call for them to carry out fully the concrete measures set out in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172, including the signing and ratifying of CTBT.8221; There is a basic difference between Indian and Japanese approaches to arms control, disarmament and international security.

There are, however, possibilities of security and strategic cooperation in some spheres, like countering international terrorism, narco-terrorism, safeguarding shipping routes from the Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca through the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean where piracy is a continuing threat. There are possibilities of cooperation between India and Japanese navies in this matter. India and Japan can develop a bilateral security relationship within the broader framework of the Asian Regional Forum, the strategic and security arm of the ASEAN, in which India has been an active and regular participant over the last five years.

Though Mori and Vajpayee did not announce any grand strategies and sign any major bilateral agreements, his visit signifies a positive shift in Japan8217;s policies towards India in the right direction. The message from Japan seems to be its acknowledgement that Indo-Japanese relations should not be predicated on or subject to the single issue of non-proliferation.

Story continues below this ad

Mutuality of political and security interests, in countering terrorism and safeguarding shipping routes, must reinforce India-Japan economic cooperation.