Plans gathered dust until enemy struck

Kargil was a major battle ground in 1948 and saw some action even in 1965 and 1971. Its strategic importance was reinforced by India8217;s Siachen success in 1984. The then GOC-in-C, Northern Army Command, proposed to raise a Brigade for operations in this area. The Brigade, a reserve formation of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps, was to be equipped with specialised equipment for operations in rugged terrain and snow-bound areas.

Taking a cue, the Directorate of Military Operations DMO commissioned a study whichsuggested the raising of a 8220;specialist mountaineer force8221; for Northern Kashmir and to equip it with 8220;all-weather all-terrain8221; tracked and wheeled vehicles, besides glacier and mountaineer clothing.

Conceived as a 8220;light armour of mountains,8221; the force was to be equipped with shoulder-fired rocket launchers for busting bunkers, 81-mm mortars, besides other weaponry held by 8220;light infantry.8221; Similarly, the combat training of the force was to be aimed at exploiting the mountains, particularly during winter months.

Ironically, the areas for use of such a specialised force which were mentioned included Gilgit, Hunza, Skardu, Kel-Kargil axis, and the Glacial Zone extending from Wakhan Corridor to Saser Kangri.

However, while the proposal to raise this force did not materialise for a variety of reasons, it was decided to nominate troops for an existing brigade 8212; called the Himalayan Brigade 8212; with headquarters at Khrew in winter, Kargil in summer. But then either due to a skewed appreciation of thethreat to the Drass-Kargil theatre or a scramble for troops to counter insurgency, the brigade was inducted into the Valley.

It was only after the magnitude of the current crisis dawned on the war-planners that the brigade was hurriedly moved towards the Drass-Kargil sector.

Officers say that for years, senior commanders made plans not exactly in tune with the ground reality. 8220;One Army Chief suddenly saw a renewed threat in the Leh-Ladakh region and airlifted tanks there. His successor surmised that the threat had waned and decided to de-induct tanks. In actual fact, the change in the ground situation was elsewhere,8221; said a senior officer.

Meanwhile, instead of safeguarding the LoC, the threat of LIW low intensity warfare and the need for counter-insurgency CI operations became the main talking points in the Army. The slow bleeding of troops in CI operations was explained as 8220;blooding of troops8221; for battle. 8220;Instead of committing Headquarter 15 Corps in CI operations, the Rashtriya RiflesHeadquarters, should have been shifted to Srinagar and given the task as belatedly done now,8221; said another officer.

At a strategic level, successive governments did little to make the alternate Manali-Leh route an all-weather one with the help of tunnels, even though the vulnerability of the Srinagar-Leh road became apparent time and again. The planners were content with the construction of minor diversions to stay clear of shelling at Drass on the Srinagar-Leh road itself.

Similarly, little attention was paid to the demands of the elected representatives of the area for raising an Army battalion of local Kargil youth.

At one point of time 1982-84, two divisions of troops consisting of at least six brigades were deployed in the Drass-Kargil-Leh area. Gradually, some of these formations were pulled out; while one brigade was committed for Siachen operations, another was pulled out for the Valley. Finally even the headquarters of one of the divisions was pulled out a few years ago. This left a neat200-km stretch from Mushkoh-Kaobal Valley to Turtuk under the charge of one Brigade.

All this when Pakistan8217;s interest in the Kargil sector was well known. It had captured the entire Gilgit, Skardu, Zojila, Drass and Kargil area in 1948 in an operation lasting eight months. Pakistan had also succeeded in interdicting the Srinagar-Kargil-Leh road for a few weeks in 1965. In 1971, Pakistan lost sizeable area in the Turtuk region overlooking the River Indus axis, which was operationally vital. It had also been showing special interest in certain areas like Marpola North of Drass and an officer, who helped demarcate this area in 1972, remembers the fuss over it by the Pakistan team.

So there were indications of a renewed Pakistan thrust for more than a decade. Pakistan shelled the Machhil sector in North Kashmir in 1991. In 1997, it shelled Guraiz and Tilel sectors, west of Drass. Last year, it resorted to heavy shelling in Kargil town. Yet, little was done at the ground level.