Minimal, credible and nuclear

What would be the quantum of nuclear arsenal, which would meet the requirements of sufficiency and survivability? The Indian version of minimum deterrence has been described as a dynamic concept, which would undergo changes because of the ever-changing security environment. Also,while articulating the theory of deterrence of small nuclear arsenals, it has been widely accepted that a figure in low three digits would constitute adequate minimum deterrence for India. However, this figure of sufficient nuclear weapons varies from approximately 150 to a little less than 400. Along with this is the requirement of delivery means. The nuclear force structure would be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets. Evidently, all this would contribute to the costs of acquiring and maintaining a posture of minimum and credible deterrence.

In 1985, General Sundarji had estimated the cost for a balanced minimum deterrent8217; at Rs 7,000 crore over 10 years. At the present value, this could be extrapolated to around Rs 13,500 core. What constituted balanced minimum deterrent8217; was not made clear. However K Subrahmanyam now Convenor, NSAB had estimated, in 1994, the cost at Rs 10,000 crore. He included the costs of 20 Prithvis, 20 Agnis, the deployment costs formobility, costs of 60 nuclear warheads and command and control and safety measures. Whether it included costs of air-delivery means and other components of the nuclear force structure was not revealed. This was, perhaps, a more conservative and possibly an accurate estimate of the costs of the minimum nuclear deterrent. And minimum deterrence being a dynamic concept, whether this quantification has been revised upwards or downwards since then is not known.

In the absence of precise quantum or composition of the minimum nuclear deterrence, a fair guesstimate can, however, be made. The costs of Agni I and Agni II missiles vary from Rs 20 crore to Rs 35 crore and the cost of Prithvi is around Rs 8 crore. Last year after Pokharan-II, the scientists had calculated the cost of atomic weapon as Rs 1 crore only, which appears to be an underestimate but likely to be correct since the research costs of development are already absorbed and are thus sunk costs8217;. The figure of one crore would, therefore, be anincremental cost of the nuclear warhead.

As a minimal posture, if we quantify our nuclear arsenal to be around 150 composed on 60 Agnis maximum cost Rs 35 crore, 40 to 60 Prithvis and balance number to be air-delivered weapons, then the costs can be easily perceived. For aircraft-delivered atomic weapons, the costs would perhaps only be of modification of pods of nuclear capable aircraft like Su 30 MKI, Mirage 2000s and Jaguars. The costs of these aircraft have already been absorbed in conventional defence budgets. Then there are costs of command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, interoperability, surveillance and reconnaissance system.

The basic command and control infrastructure already exists in the shape of Central Command Head Quarters which the Indian Air Force has planned to convert into Strategic Command. This would need to be supplanted with satellite surveillance, communication and all elements of knowledge8211;based information warfare. The costs of three-to-four satellites andother systems would be in the region of Rs 2000 to Rs. 3,000 crore. Alternatively, the ongoing modernisation programmes of the conventional forces could also absorb a proportion of the costs. There would be additional costs of operation, maintenance and training to keep the nuclear arsenal in a high state of readiness. These elements are likely to increase the costs by another Rs 2,000 to Rs 3,000 crore. Thus, without taking the costs of nuclear submarine, the total costs of minimum deterrence are likely to be in the region of Rs 10,000 crore. More likely it will be even less than this amount. However, if the quantum of the nuclear arsenal were nearer to 400, then the cost factor would increase in the same proportion. The cost of nuclear submarine would add another Rs 4,000 to Rs 5,000 crore per submarine. A minimum of two to four is, perhaps, the required number.

Some analysts tend to add the costs of atomic demolition munitions and battlefield nuclear weapons. Though not very expensive, these weapons addgreatly to the degree of difficulty in command and control problems thereby adding to costs. Also, a combination of precision weapons, heavy volume of artillery fire, smart bombs, multi-barrel rocket launchers and air strikes can better achieve the desired effects at the target. And there is no risk of escalation to nuclear war fighting. Though our draft nuclear doctrine is silent on this aspect, earlier policy statements by the defence minister have ruled out the use of battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons.

The costs of the acquisition of minimum deterrence would have to be spread over a period of time. The incidence of costs could be Rs 2,000 crore to Rs 3,000 core per year if minimal posture is adopted which appears to be very affordable. If we adopt a maximal posture nearer to 400 nuclear weapons then the costs could be Rs 5,000 crore to Rs 7,500 crore per year. These costs combined with the costs of modernisation, upgradation and filling up existing voids and deficiencies of the armed forceswould be very difficult to afford. Therefore, the minimal posture of our minimum and credible nuclear deterrence makes eminent sense. The sea-based assets could be introduced as and when our indigenous technology is able to produce them in the near future.

The writer is a Senior Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi