Between illusion and reality

Indo-Pak relations have always been surreal, thanks to the tremendous mistrust between the two countries. Nothing is ever taken at face value. This has applied even to relatively neutral ideas like a joint defence initiative for South Asia, which originally owes to Jinnah. Even today, the Lahore meet has failed to secure the first step towards such an understanding, a no-war pact. Indo-Pak relations are in anendless loop of duplicity, and the line between illusion and reality is permanently blurred.

The only pact which has been rigorously honoured is the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. The pacts at Simla and Tashkent, apparently the cornerstone of our relationship, are among the most freely violated. Both pacts contain a clause, deriving from the 1948 Inter-Dominion Confer-ence, that frowns upon negative propaganda. Every time a prime minister, a home minister or a defence minister of either country issues a strident statement, and every time the media reacts to it, both pacts are effectively broken.

In 1950, in a Parliament speech titled 8216;We cannot be enemies forever8217;, Jawaharlal Nehru was deeply pessimistic: quot;The new tradition is to carry on publicly verbal warfare in the strongest language. Per-haps that is better that fighting, but it le-ads to fighting.quot; It8217;s happening now. This round of hostilities began with the conjunction of nuclear tests 8212; which are statements wild enough to show up on the Richterscale 8212; with a lot of attendant jingoism in India. In particular, there was one statement by L.K. Advani concerning the 8216;hot pursuit8217; of militants that could be construed as a threat to invade. No amount of jubilee busmanship could counter such intemperance.

We are involved in the last cold war in the world and could profitably pay heed to the history of the first. The combative rhetoric of the Reagan presidency brought the world to the brink of nuclear war in November 1983 when NATO ran Able Archer 83. It was a routine exercise to test nuclear command and control systems but, primed by Reagan8217;s harsh language and the Star Wars project, the Russians were ready to mobilise. Oddly enough, Reagan was amazed to learn that they took him so seriously. The situation was salvaged by Gorbachev8217;s 1985 offer to declare nukes unacceptable.

The diplomacy of positive declarations has never worked in South Asia because offers and treaties have no credibility. They are directed as much at domestic constituencies and theinternational community as the other party. Besides, they are usually couched in rather vague terms.

The Cold War showed that positive declarations work only when they are unambiguously stated. Rambling on about general ethics and intentions only muddies the waters. The Yalta pact, which was to the Grand Alliance what the Simla pact is to Indo-Pak relations, wanted to establish in postwar eastern Europe quot;governments broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population.quot; The vagueness of the statement allowed the USSR take control of Romania. The Alliance collapsed and the Cold War was on.

If we want out of our own little cold war, we should learn the virtues of specificity and temperance. At the Lahore meet, the issue of liberalising visa procedures was raised, but the crucial questions went unaddressed: how and when. The foreign ministers shall meet to discuss quot;all issues of mutual concernquot;. It wouldn8217;t hurt to spell them out, or to arrive at a timeframe.

Finally, it is time forrestraint. The Kashmir issue will have to be resolved diplomatically, so credibility is a prerequisite. Last week, we witnessed the spectacle of George Fernandes granting absolution to Nawaz Sharif. A happier, softer line, certainly, but what can one say of the credibility of George Fernandes?