Nuclear no-speak

It is not a pretty sight to see the Congress party struggling to find a position on nuclear policy after an embarrassing series of contrad...

It is not a pretty sight to see the Congress party struggling to find a position on nuclear policy after an embarrassing series of contradictory public statements from its leaders. It has been two years since the nuclear tests in the Rajasthan desert but the Congress appears even more confused than it was in May 1998.

What is more, it has taken prodding by Bill Clinton to concentrate Congress minds on the issue. Of course it is a complex issue needing careful thought about the changed security scenario in the subcontinent. But by now the leading Opposition party was expected to have clarified its ideas enough to be able to speak coherently. Instead there has been the shabby spectacle of Pranab Mukherjee denying that Sonia Gandhi told Clinton India needs a minimum nuclear deterrent and of Gandhi being reduced to stony silence in Parliament. Denying the BJP any political advantage from the issue is surely less important than working out, independently, what the Congress thinks is in India8217;s interest and communicating that to the people.

It has been a bad performance from a party which is well placed to formulate policy and claim public credibility on this subject. After all, for the better part of the last 50 years, Congress governments gave shape to and were caretakers of India8217;s nuclear programmes and policies. Today the party can tap its institutional memory for Jawaharlal Nehru8217;s world vision, Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi8217;s realpolitik and Rajiv Gandhi8217;s moral concerns. It is a relief to hear brain-storming sessions are finally being held in the party8217;s foreign policy cell and that the issue is being approached in a responsible way and from many perspectives.

Congress leaders should consult widely, seek more information from the government and Department of Atomic Energy and do a thorough job before going public.

Much has been said on the issues of security and disarmament in the context of nuclear weapons. The Congress would do a great service to the country if it also studied and revealed the economic implications of the kind of nuclear posture it intends to propose and the posture adopted by the Vajpayee government. Costs have been neglected altogether. It is all very well to say grandly, as politicians love to, that India8217;s security must be assured at any cost.

However, the reality is that there is always a choice of weapons systems and security measures for any country and each has a price tag. Costs are important and should be known. There have been some significant developments since the tests of May 1998 necessitated a change in the country8217;s nuclear policy. The government has never succeeded in defining a 8220;minimum nuclear deterrent8221; but the general understanding is it will be affordable.

However, the draft nuclear doctrine which has been submitted makes ambitious proposals for land-based, airborne and seaborne nuclear forces. No one has said what it will cost to build and maintain safely this triad of forces. That is certainly something the Congress can and should bring to light. The implications of the war in Kargil need to be studied. It appears to explode the myth that nuclear weapons bring about a reduction of expenditure on conventional weapons and forces. Cost-benefit analyses of nuclear postures will definitely be useful.