Kashmiris are worriedly relishing the days before Eid. This is not because they want to fast indefinitely, but because the end of Ramzan could signal the conclusion of the peace initiative 8212; the unilateral cessation of hostilities by the armed forces 8212; launched by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. It is a different matter that most people in the Valley have their own doubts about the motive behind this initiative 8212; as they do about the reciprocal gesture by Pakistan, which stopped cross-border shelling and announced restraint on the Line of Control. But the unilateral ceasefire has turned out to be a happy reprieve from the grim routine of crackdown and search-and-cordon operations, of frisking and identity parades. Though the move has not exactly silenced the rattle of guns and the boom of bombs, it certainly has eased the daily lives of common people.
The security agencies have acted with restraint, even when there is a militant strike, thus leaving civilians out of the battle. But there is apprehension that if the initiative unravels, it may permanently harm the prospects of again charting a path towards a lasting resolution.
The prime minister8217;s unilateral ceasefire has come as a surprise to almost every player in the conflict. For many it is yet another bluff, to checkmate Pakistan by exhibiting a politically correct image before the international community. By the same token, few interpret the reciprocal Pakistani declaration of quot;maximum restraintquot; on the LoC as a gesture of peace.
However, these tiny steps are significant because they have altered the basic language of war and hostility between the two neighbours. At least the lexicon of competition has changed from Agnis and Ghauris to ceasefire and restraint. This definitely is a welcome change, and perhaps could even herald the beginning of a new era. One only hopes that the mutual bluffs called by India and Pakistan last long enough for them to appreciate the need for a deeper investment in peace.
The ceasefire, even if observed by the militants as well, is a temporary measure. It will only have value if it is immediately complemented with other developments. The first step would be to extend the truce, even if the adversaries step up their violent campaign. A month is simply not long enough to test the waters for peace. By extending the gesture, India would keep the initiative alive and give those elements within the separatist camp who want to respond positively more time to consolidate their position. It would also allow common Kashmiris to appreciate the decrease in violence.
One month is also too short a time for those who have lived by violence for years to suddenly change their ways. The Hizbul Mujahideen is yet to respond clearly to this peace offer, while many other groups are watching closely to discern the quot;real agendaquot; behind the move. The culture of mutual suspicion and mistrust is so deep rooted that no one can get rid of it overnight.
The Hurriyat leadership has been demanding permission to visit Pakistan to talk to the quot;boys with gunsquot; and convince them to reciprocate the gesture. If they are allowed, it will help build bridges, take the peace initiative miles forward and lay the groundwork for meaningful negotiations. On the other hand, if this initiative turns out to be as ephemeral as the fizz of soda water, the biggest victim will be the Hurriyat. The separatist conglomerate, which has taken years to emerge as the political face and voice of the militancy, will surely split, never to reunite. Though it finally fashioned a united response, the fissures within this political forum have never surfaced as vividly as during this ceasefire period.
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The role of the jihadis within the quot;movementquot; is also being debated, with serious divisions on what should be the Lakshman rekha for the quot;guest militantsquot; who have volunteered to help the Kashmiris in their war of freedom. If the ceasefire proves yet another diplomatic gimmick, and ends in another phase of violence, it will only strengthen the quot;never believe Delhi lobbyquot; within the separatists. Thus it will give leverage to those who do not recommend sitting across a table to resolve disputes.
It may not be long before the two main jihadi outfits, the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad an amalgamation of two Harkats, are no longer considered foreign in Kashmir. Both have been conducting large-scale recruitments in the Valley and in the Doda-Rajouri-Poonch belt in Jammu, thus becoming increasingly indigenous. Half the Fidayeens killed in suicide attacks in the Valley since August 1999 were local recruits of these jihadi outfits. Today the foreign militants are blamed as outsiders who hamper the peace process, but tomorrow they may become a legitimate party to the conflict, making it impossible for all three principal actors 8211;India, Pakistan and the Hurriyat 8212; to even dream of a dialogue for peace.
The other factor that could undermine the ceasefire is the Centre8217;s insistence that it will not accept talks that include Pakistan. If it remains rigid on this point, its true aim may be to secure an alibi to blame Pakistan and the separatists for undermining the process. This would enable India to claim to the world that it tried its best to chase peace but failed, while holding on to what it really wants, control of Kashmir.
The Centre has already tried this gambit once. The previous ceasefire called by the indigenous Hizbul Mujahideen collapsed when New Delhi refused to accept that Pakistan be included in talks at any level. Thus, even the modalities for implementing that initiative could not be worked out. It is now clear that Pakistan must be involved if any peace deal is to be brokered in Kashmir. By sticking rigidly to bilateralism, the Centre is only pushing Kashmir to a point of no return, a scenario in which the jihadis could takecomplete control and the violence could spiral out of even Pakistan8217;s hands.
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The peace achieved through all previous important bilateral agreements between New Delhi and Islamabad Tashkent, Shimla or New Delhi and Srinagar the Indira-Abdullah accord was only temporary. What is at stake now is a real opportunity to find a permanent solution. If New Delhi feels that by playing the politics of ceasefire, it will get a chance to crack down on the militants and curb the gun by force, this would be a tragic mistake. The need is to address the disease, not just the symptoms. To resolve this problem once and for all, there is a need to take a major step forward 8212; not only to silence the guns, but to set them aside and sit at the table. This time, despite the continued rhetoric of suspicion, all the enemies may finally be ready to sit together. But if the ceasefire collapses, as happened in August, this tentative willingness to talk might vanish in a hail of bullets, leaving Kashmir once more at the mercy of the gun.
By extending the gesture, India would give those elements within the separatist camp who want to respond positively more time to consolidate
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