Opinion Obama’s Munich moment

— Sergey Lavrov,Russian foreign minister

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The first step,let me be clear,does not say that Iran has a right to enrich uranium

— John Kerry,US secretary of state

The stark contradiction in the preceding assessments of the significance of the P5+1 agreement signed in Geneva,providing sanctions relief for Iran in exchange of a marginal and temporary deceleration of its nuclear programme,is indicative of the problematic (that is,“pernicious”) ambiguity in the newly signed pact. It is an ominous harbinger of the difficulties that will be encountered in interpreting whether future Iranian behaviour constitutes compliance with,or contravention of,its terms. It is indicative of the hurdles that will have to be overcome in reconstituting a united international front against Tehran,should any suspicion — however well-founded — arise that it is in violation of its commitments.

Of course,one cannot assert with deterministic certainty that the deal will fail. It may perhaps succeed and produce the hoped for results and precipitate an unequivocal and verifiable abandonment by Iran of its drive for weaponised nuclear capability. But it is also conceivable that pigs may one day develop aerodynamic attributes and begin to fly.

In the real world,one seldom,if ever,has the luxury of certainty. Virtually all decisions are assessments of possible costs and rewards,and the probability and significance of their occurrence. If the costs are bearable,one might be justified in taking greater risks in striving for rewards. But when the costs are liable to be catastrophic,prudence dictates adopting policies in which the dominant emphasis is on avoiding failure,rather than attaining success.

By this criterion,the deal hammered out in Geneva under the leadership of the Obama administration was a bad one,a very bad one. Indeed,this would even be the verdict of self-declared Obama-philes such as Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz. In interviews,Dershowitz made the following acerbic assessment: “When you do a risk-benefit analysis,the possibility that this will actually result in ending Iran’s nuclear weapons programme is probably in the range of 10 per cent… But when you weigh that against the 30 or 40 per cent chance that they’re dead wrong — nuclear bomb wrong — then it’s a very bad assessment of risk and benefits… This is first-year negotiating theory,and this administration gets a D-minus with grade inflation. You don’t let up on sanctions that are working.”

Just how absurd is the rationale underlying the Geneva agreement is perhaps best conveyed by the confused arguments advanced by its most avid supporters,such as celebrated New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman. Friedman,arguably one of Obama’s most devout apologists,in a recent article entitled “Let’s Make a Deal”,strongly endorsed the efforts made by the Obama administration,led by John Kerry,as “good for us and good for our allies”. Yet,even Friedman concedes: “Iran has lied and cheated its way to the precipice of building a bomb,and… without tough economic sanctions Iran would not be at the negotiating table.” But then,in a non sequitur of epic proportions,he applauds the Geneva endeavour,urging that the US desist from the only thing that has worked (“tough sanctions”) and adopt what hasn’t (belief in the goodwill of those who have “lied and cheated”). Friedman’s pitiful attempt to justify appeasement of belligerent tyranny reflects the triumph of naïve hopes over bitter experience — and epitomises the perils inherent in the P5+1 prescription.

The most media-prominent dispute over the issue of sanctions relief has,of course,been between the White House and the Israeli government. This was reflected in the diametrically opposing assessments articulated by the leaders of the two countries. Obama lauded the accord declaring that it “opened up a new path towards a world that is more secure”. By contrast,Binyamin Netanyahu excoriated the pact,warning that “the world has become a much more dangerous place,because the most dangerous regime in the world has taken a significant step towards attaining the most dangerous weapon in the world.”

But it would be a mistake to characterise the disagreement over the Geneva deal as a purely US-Israel rift. Indeed,it reflects just as much internal US dissent as to its merits — or lack thereof. As one pundit,a longstanding supporter of the Democratic Party remarked: “This is not a conflict between Israel and the US alone. I would say that the best minds in the US are against this deal. Certainly a lot of the people whom I have spoken to,who are not particularly concerned about anything but American security,think it’s a bad deal.”

Indeed,even Jeffrey Goldberg,widely considered a mouthpiece of the Obama administration on Middle East affairs,warned: “lifting sanctions on Iran prematurely is a bad idea… easing sanctions… makes little sense unless the Iranians agree to suspend their uranium-enrichment activities…” Not only does the P5+1 pact not do this,but the Iranians — and the Russians — insist that it in fact establishes their right to do so!

But beyond the US-Israel row and the domestic dissent in the US,the Geneva deal has caused concern and consternation among America’s Sunni allies in the Gulf area,and notably with the Saudis,described in some media channels as “apoplectic”. Typical of Saudi sentiment was that expressed by Prince Alwaleed bin Talal,and conveyed how US credibility has been shredded in the Middle East: “There’s no confidence in the Obama administration doing the right thing with Iran. We’re really concerned — Israel,Saudi Arabia,the Middle East countries — about this.” Trenchantly,he asked: “Why are they offering relief? Sanctions are what brought about the negotiations to begin with! Why not keep the pressure up?”

This mood of disenchantment and despair with the US may have dire unintended consequences and lead to a spiralling arms race — with Sunni Arabs and Turks scrambling to develop,or purchase,their own non-conventional capabilities to match that of the Shia Iranians. Hardly something that would make the world “more secure”.

It is not difficult then to identify with the exasperation reflected in an article written by Alan Dershowitz,in Israel’s left-leaning,dovish daily Haaretz,in which he warns that this could be Obama’s “Chamberlain moment”. He fulminates: “Indeed all reasonable,thinking people should understand that weakening the sanctions against Iran without demanding that they dismantle their nuclear weapons programme is a prescription for disaster. Have we learned nothing from North Korea and Neville Chamberlain?”

Indeed,the smell of Munich is in the air.

The writer,a former advisor to the Yitzhak Shamir government,is the founder and executive director of the Israel Institute for Strategic Studies.