
It suits the governments in New Delhi and Islamabad to sustain bilateral estrangement. They have developed a vested interest in maintaining the distance. That is the reason why all contacts, particularly non-official, have been snapped for all practical purposes. The reduction of diplomatic staff in each other8217;s high commissions only adds a dramatic dimension to the continuing chill.
The BJP has learnt through experience in Gujarat how to make a bid for electoral success by raising the bogey of Pakistan. Hindutva leaders have come to believe that an anti-Pakistan bias at some stage gets converted into an anti-Muslim sentiment. Therefore, even when references were made to General Pervez Musharraf during electioneering in Gujarat, the word 8220;Mian8221; was prefixed to deride the Muslim community.
Since the party has no compunction in playing the religious card, it will not initiate or reciprocate any step for Indo-Pak conciliation, from within or without the country. The argument is, why should it do anything that may confuse potential voters at a time when elections are due in 10 states within a year and in the country within 20 months.
Terrorism, too, has come in handy for the BJP. It has created the impression that the sponsors of terrorist activity are either people from across the border or from among the fundamentalists living in India. Since those apprehended or killed happen to be Muslims, particularly from Pakistan, the question of their motive is increasingly suspect. No better scenario would have been possible for the spread of saffronisation because it strengthens the Sangh Parivar8217;s agenda to create ill will against Pakistan as well as Muslims. This simply accentuates religious polarisation.
The Pakistan government is equally comfortable with the situation. It helps Islamabad in two ways. One, it can announce itself as a defender of Islam and of the two-nation theory rejected by India. No wonder President Musharraf raised the question of Gujarat at the United Nations to emphasise that Pakistan has the right to speak on behalf of India8217;s Muslims. Two, Musharraf can allay the fears of religious parties in Pakistan that he has left jehadi militants in Kashmir high and dry after pressure from US President George Bush.
In fact, Islamabad can take comfort in its assessment that it has been able to 8220;hoodwink8221; Washington on the existence of training camps in Pakistan. One specific example is that of the ISI misleading the FBI agents who visited a suspected militant training camp in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. Intelligence officials reportedly ordered inhabitants 8212; 35 of them were from Saudi Arabia 8212; to hide in the jungle to make the camp appear deserted.
Still New Delhi, although unhappy with Washington for not putting enough pressure on Islamabad, is somewhat satisfied that it has brought down the level of terrorism. On the other hand, Islamabad feels gratified that some Lashkar-e-Toiba militants here and some Fidayeens there have kept India on tenterhooks. Strangely enough, Pakistan sees in President Musharraf8217;s visit to Moscow 8220;a chink in the armour8221; of friendship between India and Russia, although Moscow has sent New Delhi the verbatim record of conversation between President Musharraf and President Vladimir Putin.
Whatever message this may convey, the fact remains that the entire gamut of Indo-Pakistan relations suffers on account of the belief that both should persist with their tit-for-tat policy. Any leeway, according to them, will appear to be a departure from the tough stand the two have come to adopt for their own purposes. That retired diplomats and former military officers have played havoc on both sides goes without saying. Close to the government on both sides, they provide inputs for accusations, threats and cussedness.
While in Islamabad, I was amused to hear that Pakistan was not in favour of reciprocating India8217;s gesture of allowing PIA flights over Indian airspace because it was costing New Delhi 8220;a hell of a lot of money8221; while taking circuitous routes to avoid Pakistani airspace. But at the same time I was asked: Suppose Islamabad allowed over-flying of Indian aircraft, would New Delhi allow PIA to land at Delhi? Our foreign office is aware of this. My impression is that it will happen sooner than later but nobody can give an undertaking beforehand. Still, this indicates the extent of pettifogging.
Pakistan is yet to give India MFN status, which New Delhi accorded to Islamabad a couple of years ago. Under the WTO charter, this is automatic. Why should Islamabad drag its feet when it is obliged to take the step eventually? I found Pakistan divided on this issue. Once again the enmity against India seems to be affecting the decision. Similarly, India8217;s participation in the SAF Games in Islamabad would generate friendly feelings. But that does not fit into the BJP8217;s scheme of things.
Against this background, the appointment of a former bureaucrat, N.N. Vohra, as New Delhi8217;s interlocutor on Jammu and Kashmir does not help the situation. True, he has been appointed to talk only with the leaders on our side. But at some stage New Delhi will have to associate Pakistan for a final settlement. This is spelt out both in the Shimla Agreement and in the Lahore Declaration. A political leader of stature would have sent a correct message not only to Srinagar but also to Islamabad.
One hopes that the Hurriyat will not be kept out. But whoever he talks to, Vohra will have to have a brief. New Delhi does not have a policy on Kashmir except that it wants to curb 8220;the insurgency8221; in the state. But then a ruling party that does not accept Article 370, giving a special status to Jammu and Kashmir, cannot be expected to go far, much less accommodate those who seek autonomy within the federal framework.