India works on Lankan devolution package

The devolution package has become central to the Government8217;s strategy in dealing with the current crisis in Sri Lanka, especially since it is determined not to participate in any form of military intervention that would put at risk the lives of Indian soldiers.

8220;India wants peace in Sri Lanka, but we8217;re not in the business of brokering a ceasefire,8221; highly placed sources in the Government said, adding that intervention was like a 8220;pit full of venomous snakes and must not be reattempted.8221;

The sources also pointed out that an integral part of New Delhi foreign policy was to 8220;manage the sentiment in Tamil Nadu.8221; That is, to take into account the sentiments of Tamilians as well as the political compulsions of some of the BJP Government8217;s partners in coalition, without which any strategy would be incomplete and ineffective.

The first condition for the Indian devolution proposal is that there must be 8220;political consensus8221; within Sri Lanka, including by the Opposition. While New Delhi wants the current devolution package to go beyond the 1987 package which accorded a merger of the North and East provinces, Chandrika Kumaratunga8217;s 1997 package, which goes much further but is being disputed by the Opposition, seeks to change the unitary character of Sri Lanka into a federal state.

The Government sources, meanwhile, also debunked speculation about New Delhi being in touch with the LTTE, saying that they were well aware of the 8220;track record8221; of the guerrilla outfit.

In fact, New Delhi is quite happy to let the Norwegian government, backed as it is by the US and the European Union, deal with the LTTE. The International Committee for the Red Cross ICRC as well as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees are other avenues through which the Government ascertains the LTTE views.

Aware that any direct contact with the LTTE was tantamount to committing the 8220;same errors8221; as in 1987, the Government prefers to let the Norwegians and others act as 8220;shock-absorbers8221; in mediating the conflict.

Under the circumstances, New Delhi8217;s view is that, while it is prepared for humanitarian assistance 8212; which could include an evacuation of Sri Lankan troops by sea or air 8212; it is fully aware of the enormous problems attendant on evacuation.

8220;The most difficult operation in war is withdrawal. Infinitely more difficult is evacuation,8221; the sources said.

The fluidity of the military situation in Jaffna is preventing New Delhi from making a conclusive assessment of how the war is unfolding there. Certainly, there is no firm belief that Jaffna town will fall sooner or later, but even if it does, the sources said, that did not mean that the entire peninsula was also going to come under control of the LTTE.