High risks, low benefits

What India has lost in terms of an opportunity by not sending troops with the US will only become clear as the Iraq drama plays out. But this past experience shows that it has already gained by recognising that a UN mandate serves as more than a fig leaf, it provides real cover against insurgency in a foreign country.

Despite the cloak of principle in India8217;s polite demurral, the decision was actually based on calculations of realpolitik, both global and domestic. Which is how it should be. If principle alone bought international standing, India would have become a superpower in Nehru8217;s time. But as we discovered then, prestige and stature does not equal power and influence. The logic behind such a decision must hinge on a simple question: is national interest served by backtracking from our idealistic disapproval of America8217;s invasion of Iraq, towards co-operation in that country8217;s restructuring? If there are great benefits to be obtained, principle can be sacrificed for pragmatism. Notwithstanding the keenness within sections of the government to link arms with India8217;s new strategic partner, there was broad opposition to the proposal within the strategic community, the press, the Opposition and within sections of the government itself. And so the bottom line was: no consensus, doubtful benefits, too much risk.

When India was first asked for troops, both the army and decision-makers within the Prime Minister8217;s Office were for obliging the US. But at that time there was underlying Iraqi goodwill for America. Injured pride at their military defeat was tempered with relief at being rid of Saddam Hussein. Control the looters, fix the electricity and plumbing, the Iraqis told the Americans, and then leave. Going in then would have bought India goodwill.

But the rules of the game are now very different. With the Americans unable to control the vast spaces of Iraq, the continuing anarchy has bred Iraqi disillusionment and resentment. Saddam8217;s loyalists have regrouped and are continuing the fight. American commanders in Baghdad admit that the Baath Party has called in Syrian, Saudi, Yemeni, Algerian, Lebanese and Chechen fighters. American briefings have already started using the lexicon of insurgency: 8216;8216;infiltration across the Iran-Iraq border8217;8217;, 8216;8216;foreign militants8217;8217; and 8216;8216;training camps8217;8217;. If the US had hoped that a new Iraq would radiate democracy into the Middle East, quite the opposite has happened. Fundamentalist fighters are being sucked into what was, for jehadis, a no-go country.

Keenly watching this struggle are the Iraqi people, unconvinced about whether America will stay or leave. In the Kafkaesque Iraq of today, even the wildest rumours have credibility. Saddam8217;s imminent reappearance is whispered of in many homes. An astonishing number of Iraqis believe that the US itself struck a deal with him and that he is alive and well. With guerrilla strikes becoming effective and Saddam8217;s recorded voice urging resistance, it is hardly surprising that the Iraqi people are reluctant to support an occupier who they believe could depart, leaving them to the mercy of a tyrant returned from the grave. The chickens of 1991, when America abandoned the Shia and Kurd uprisings, have truly come home to roost.

But while recognising the need to demonstrate staying power, the US cannot bring in more troops from their own army. Even while 230,000 American troops remain deployed in the Gulf region, most Americans still support their country8217;s involvement in Iraq. But sending in any more 8216;8216;American boys8217;8217; will be laden with symbolism, recalling the slow slide into Vietnam, when US troops there rose from 16,000 in 1965 to 500,000 two years later. The additional forces, therefore, have to be coaxed from old allies like the UK or hopeful aspirants like Poland.

With vast experience in handling insurgency, an Indian division in Iraq would have probably brought control to any area where they were deployed. But what of the political price in the Middle East? An Indian troop presence there would stamp our name in many Arab perceptions alongside that of Israel. Islamist theorizers have long postulated a Christian-Jewish-Hindu axis against Islam. India8217;s secularity and the friendly association of Indian workers in the Middle East have so far insulated us from being portrayed as a 8216;8216;Hindu8217;8217; entity. But soldiers carrying guns and, inevitably, using them against Arabs will gift credibility to this paranoid theory. This will resonate not just in Iraq but with our own jehadis in Kashmir as well.

What then could America offer India in return for being painted black in a region where it has such stakes?

New Delhi has not missed the lessons of the unfolding Israel-Palestine peace process where America has, over the preceding year, helped Israel create the conditions for a favourable settlement. Despite its public posturing, South Block knows well that American pressure has forced a Pakistani squeeze on jehadi groups in PoK. As Indian security forces in J038;K gain ground against militancy, Pakistan8217;s only real influence there 8212; militant guns 8212; is steadily waning. India, like Israel, hopes for a settlement on its own terms with terrorism under control. Sending troops to Iraq, says this logic, will maintain the American squeeze on Islamabad.

Cooling down hotspots that breed Islamic fundamentalism is indeed a cornerstone of American strategy for the war on terror. And the road from Jerusalem may well lead to Srinagar. But this logic falters in the assumption that America will do for India what it has done for Israel. Pakistan, unlike Palestine, is a State with which the US has a vital and independent relationship, which it cannot jeopardise by pushing it beyond a point. Every American signal over the preceding months points to their belief that Pakistan has done what was needed and that the onus is now on India.

There are many reasons to push forward India8217;s strategic relationship with the US. American support will be essential for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, and eventually in legitimising India8217;s nuclear status. Its partnership in trade, its assistance in high-tech projects will be essential for India8217;s economic development. But this assistance will eventually come as a result of India8217;s long-term stability and balance, not by fighting America8217;s wars for it.

There are few images as definitive or symbolic as a country8217;s troops marching off an aircraft onto foreign soil. They represent the ultimate commitment of a nation to a cause. In this case, India8217;s benefit lies in the cause of UN multilateralism, not an American imperium. America may still be forced by casualties and domestic opinion to seek a UN peacekeeping mandate. Until then, keep the army at home.

The writer is a correspondent with NDTV