Loose cannons?

A cultural change seems to have taken place at the top of the armed services. Instead of a soldierly silence on matters that could be deemed to be still under discussion by the civilian authorities,or that touch upon sensitive matters of internal security,the leaders of our military seem to be willing to discuss,at length and in public,decisions that most feel should probably be weighed with considerably more care than appears to be on display. Most recently,Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik has unburdened himself of his view that the chief of defence staff is a position that is unnecessary and before its time. Meanwhile,the government has allowed uncertainty to persist over whether the army chief,General V.K. Singhs age may be amended,with obvious consequences for many senior armymen.

Taken together,these instances revive apprehensions that no one is in control at the ministry of defence to address what is now an open disconnect between the civilian and military leaderships. Whenever such a disconnect happened in the past,national security had been diminished. It is,for instance,far from clear whether Naiks opinion on the CDS is the opinion of the air force as a whole,of its current head,of the services in general,or of the defence ministry. That is,indeed,one of the central problems caused by undue loquaciousness among the heads of the services. The persuasiveness or not of his views apart,such half-considered statements are not best made in the public glare these are,in any case,decisions that are made by the government. Earlier,the army and IAF chiefs had similarly weighed in on deploying the armed forces in areas affected by Naxal violence. More recently, General V.K. Singh told the public that Indias armed forces had the capability to carry out an Abbottabad-like operation if they were so ordered to.

Ultimate responsibility for this must lie with the defence minister. There is a sense in which his ministry has been unable to engage,and also provide political cover for,Indias top brass. There is the additional,and related,problem that the very capabilities that General Singh was talking about have been severely eroded by irresponsibility in the defence ministry. Decisions tend to be postponed about purchases and indeed about consolidating command,of the sort that was recommended by the Arun Singh committee after Kargil,and which has gone unimplemented for so long that the IAFs head can attack it today,in 2011. The defence ministry needs to wake up,and the top brass should recover an earlier,becoming,restraint.