Islamabad shift

Asking this question has become necessary after three recent events. The first was a major violent attempt by militants to infiltrate into Jammu and Kashmir. A second was renewed military tension on the Kashmir frontier, in violation of the existing ceasefire arrangement. The third was the shock of the brutal bombings in Jaipur.

On its part, India has signalled that it will not let these events derail the peace process and remains open for decisive forward movement. But it needs two to tango. There are good reasons to wonder if the current government in Pakistan has the capacity to sustain the necessary environment for the peace process and the political will to take the next steps.

The rather productive peace process with Pakistan since 2004 has rested on a grand bargain. Islamabad agreed to stop all support to cross-border terrorism in India. New Delhi in turn promised to negotiate purposefully in resolving the Kashmir question. And in the interim the two sides agreed to build mutual trust through a variety of confidence building measures.

This bargain appeared to work reasonably well, at least until recently. A ceasefire all along the Indo-Pak frontier has held since the end of 2003. Trade between the two countries has picked up a new momentum. People-to-people contact has improved considerably.

India and Pakistan have also pressed ahead with a substantive dialogue on resolving the Kashmir question. These sensitive negotiations, between the special envoys of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Musharraf, have been held in secret. It is widely known, however, that the two sides had made considerable progress in defining the framework for a mutually acceptable settlement.

There have been extended periods of lull in cross-border infiltration and violent attacks in Kashmir and the rest of India, punctuated occasionally by brutal bombings like the ones in New Delhi October 2005 and Mumbai July 2006. In the wake of those attacks, there was enough determination in New Delhi and Islamabad to insulate the peace process from these attacks.

After the Jaipur blasts, Menon and Mukherjee must wonder about the current dynamic in Pakistan, especially in relation to the war on terror and the new rhetoric on Kashmir. Is Islamabad going soft on terrorism, in the name of a political engagement with the militant groups? Is Pakistan buying domestic peace with terrorist groups by allowing them a free hand across its borders? These questions animate not just India but also Afghanistan, which faces cross-border attacks from the Taliban based in Pakistan. The United States, the European Union and NATO, all of whom have high stakes in the stability of the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan, are debating these concerns openly.

On Kashmir, too, a series of statements from the top leadership in Islamabad have spread confusion on the intent of the new government. First Asif Ali Zardari, leader of the Pakistan People8217;s Party and the lynchpin of the governing political coalition, argued that the new government was more interested in promoting trade and other cooperation with India than in resolving the Kashmir question.

This was entirely needless given the reality of a serious ongoing negotiation on Kashmir. Once the inevitable negative reaction to his statements emerged in Pakistan, Zardari quickly backed off. But the Pakistani prime minister, Gilani, has swung to the other extreme. He has restored the old rhetoric of resolving the Kashmir question in accordance with the United Nations resolutions. What we do not know is whether Gilani is unaware of the negotiations with India on Kashmir or he is simply signalling a change in policy.

Among the many disturbing aspects of the new line on Kashmir is the indication that the new dispensation in Islamabad has returned to the bad old habit of projecting to its domestic audiences that Kashmir is at the centre of Pakistan8217;s diplomatic engagement with the rest of the world. After Gilani8217;s meeting with US President George W. Bush on the sidelines of a conference in Egypt over the weekend, Pakistani officials were putting out the spin that Kashmir was very high on their bilateral agenda. One would have thought Gilani had enough on his plate answering Bush8217;s questions on the faltering war on terror on the frontier with Afghanistan.

As India and Pakistan started the historic negotiations on Kashmir in 2005, they had agreed to dispense with the past populist rhetoric and concentrate on finding a pragmatic way forward. To his credit, Musharraf did enforce a verbal discipline on Pakistan8217;s public statements on Kashmir and a measure of control over cross-border terrorism. All indications are that Gilani8217;s government seems unable to maintain these restraints.

It would have been reasonable to assume that the recent tranquility on its eastern borders with India was a blessing for Pakistan amidst the more daunting challenges it faces at home and the many serious threats to its territorial sovereignty on its western frontier with Afghanistan.

What New Delhi wants to know is whether the conflicting signals from Islamabad are part of a temporary confusion amidst the change of guard in Islamabad or a structural change for the worse.

India would fondly hope that the answers that Menon and Mukherjee might come up with are not discouraging ones. However, as Pakistan negotiates a strange moment in its evolution, India cannot afford to take anything for granted in Islamabad.

The writer is a professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

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