A virtual statement

New Delhi must also allow for the possibility that G-8 leaders are somewhat taken aback by the intensity of Indian diplomatic efforts including the National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra8217;s dash to Europe on the eve of the Cologne summit to persuade the G-8 to take a clear-cut position on the conflict over the LoC. Compared to India8217;s traditional prickly, keep-your-hands-off approach on such matters, some would be bound to wonder whether this was not a virtual plea for intervention in the subcontinent.

It is disappointing that the G-8 has beenless than forthright about the nature of armed intrusions in Kargil which are directed and controlled by Pakistan8217;s army. The statement is less specific than either President Bill Clinton8217;s letter to Nawaz Sharif asking him to use his influence to pull out the infiltrators from Kargil or Moscow8217;s statement on similar lines.

On a number of counts, a strong and explicit G-8 statement would have been appropriate. A bilateral treaty, recognised in international law, which has kept the peace on the India-Pakistan border for almost three decades has been breached. Even if the claim is to be accepted that the infiltrators are acting on their own, their armed action is tantamount to terrorism launched from Pakistani territory. It is not that the G-8 does not have the true facts at its disposal.

In all probability it is proceeding cautiously for tactical purposes and reasons which have to do with the internal political situation in Pakistan. The belief will be that international diplomatic pressure must be given achance to work. A second factor influencing the leaders at Cologne was no doubt a reluctance to raise the political rhetoric to a level where it becomes incumbent on them to act in defence of international principles. New Delhi must take all this into account.

The G-8 statement calls any military action to change the status quo on the LoC irresponsible and for an immediate end to these actions. The operative words 8220;any military action8221; are calculated to satisfy both New Delhi and Islamabad since they can be taken to mean both armed action by mercenaries and by the Pakistani army. By giving Islamabad the option to keep alive the fiction that it is not directly involved, the G-8 have left it a face-saving way out of its misadventure.

It is clear that New Delhi cannot and indeed should not expect the G-8 to pull its chestnuts out of the fire. Indian army operations have made good headway and and secured a crucial section of the Kargil-Leh highway by recovering the whole Tololing heights. The way forwardfrom here is to assess at which point the combination of international and military pressure will make a resumption of talks with Islamabad fruitful.