2003, Our Pak Odyssey

It is difficult to imagine it was exactly a year ago, to date, that we came so close to war with Pakistan. The bulk of the troop mobilisatio...

It is difficult to imagine it was exactly a year ago, to date, that we came so close to war with Pakistan. The bulk of the troop mobilisation had taken place, there were massive artillery exchanges and UAVs were being brought down. It was only this week last year that we saw Musharraf8217;s very shaken face at the SAARC summit in Kathmandu, the dramatised handshake with Vajpayee and then the speech of January 12. War, you thought then, was inevitable; the only man willing to rule it out emphatically, and publicly, was Chief Election Commissioner Lyngdoh who waved away any doubts on the Uttar Pradesh elections with a dismissive 8220;there will be no war8221;, though he should have been the last to know.

Musharraf has now chosen to reopen that story with his claim of having deterred us with a nuclear threat. This has left his voluble spokesman, Rashid Qureshi, in an unusual position. Normally other people end up having to clarify his tall talk. Now he has to prevaricate on his big boss8217;s bravado.

Musharraf8217;s talk of winning the nuclear war without fighting it, is so much bull. What prevented war, instead, was the grovelling promise of a permanent end to terrorism by Pakistan. It has been kept only partly, as even Americans acknowledge. But in spite of the election, the fighting equation has changed dramatically in Kashmir this year. The armed forces8217; casualties are down to a little less than half of the previous year8217;s and the terrorists8217; have nearly doubled. An election that has the promise of initiating a popular catharsis has also been held. This is more than what any short, punitive war would have achieved. The question now is how to build on these gains, how to ensure we do not return to the same state of angry uncertainty in the new year as well.

Take January 12, 2001, as a major watershed. Then see how the three players are placed on the same date this year. India would savour the improvement in Kashmir, as also international support on cross-border terrorism. Beyond that, there are problems. Between the Pakistanis refusing to deliver more, our denying them the face-saver of talks and the Americans shy of pushing a 8216;weakened8217; Musharraf any further, India8217;s own policy has stalled. So it has, for Pakistan and America. Musharraf8217;s sudden rush of blood, his claims of having won the nuclear war without fighting, his calling the Indian army demoralised, underlines his desperation to deflect criticism that he has abandoned Kashmir and that Pakistan8217;s case has weakened after elections in the Valley. That all these claims have been made while addressing his armed forces is no coincidence. A thought, even if it is peripheral to the argument at hand: just who seems more worried about his armed forces being demoralised?

It can now be told that one unconventional threat Musharraf held out was a nationwide jehad against India: half a million armed bearded ones storming across the border. This, he pleaded, was a legitimate weapon to offset India8217;s conventional superiority

His policy has stalled as well, leaving him at a serious disadvantage. India will not give him the pleasure of talks. Also, the way Gujarat has now scripted the BJP8217;s politics for the election years of 2003-4, a rapprochement with Pakistan will not fit into the picture. You cannot make peace with Pakistan and seek votes against terrorism, you cannot talk to Mian Musharraf and then paint your rivals as his stooges. The US is unlikely to send any more goodies his way soon unless he shows movement with India. How is he likely to respond to this stalemate? And the Americans? Now they are busy with Iraq. But somebody in the state department must be looking ahead to April, when the campaign season resumes across the LoC. Would/ can they do something to prevent another showdown this spring? Or will they also continue to stall and drift?

No situation of such complexity and tension can remain stalemated. In theory, there are three ways this could be broken: if India dramatically proposes talks again, as it had done with Agra; if the Americans come up with an aggressively interventionist formula to solve the issue; or if another major terrorist strike takes place. You don8217;t have to be an expert to guess which of the three is most likely. And if your guess is as good as mine, you can also predict how the game will unfold from then on. India will respond to a big terrorist strike 8212; which would obviously be close to some election campaign 8212; by flexing its retaliatory muscle, the Americans will again resume shuttle diplomacy and so on. We will be back, firmly, in uncertain, scary, 2001. It would therefore be imprudent to let things drift.

We are now caught in the Terrror/Musharraf trap. God knows that Musharraf has given us enough reason, but we err in overly personalising our policy by letting our distrust and loathing of the man override our instinct. The final solution to our problem lies not in settling the Kashmir problem but in solving not just ours, but everybody8217;s Pakistan problem. Everybody knows that this cannot be done through an all-out war of any sort. It can only be done by changing the very nature of Pakistan8217;s society and polity. Pakistan has to be nudged back into a democratic stream where the army and the establishment lose their hold. The power of the fundamentalists in Pakistan is exaggerated. They ride the back of the army, as they did in the recent elections. If Benazir with her PPP and Nawaz with his Muslim League had not been kept out, the fundoos would never have got so many votes. But what else do you expect when you knock the centre of gravity out of your politics? What would happen if, by some decree, somebody barred the Congress or the BJP from contesting in India? Somebody will fill that vacuum and that somebody could be the Shiv Sena or the VHP.

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The final solution lies not in settling the Kashmir problem but in solving not just ours, but everybody8217;s Pakistan problem. It can only be done by nudging Pakistan back into the democratic stream where the army and the establishment lose their hold

It can also now be told that one unconventional threat Musharraf had held out during the crisis was a nationwide jehad against India. His regime had painted a horrific scenario where a half million armed bearded ones would storm across the borders to create mayhem in Indian towns and villages. It was actually with this argument that Musharraf had countered American demands to dismantle his terror camps. The militias, he had pleaded, were a legitimate weapon to offset India8217;s conventional superiority. It is, therefore, unrealistic to expect him to dismantle them now or later. Such a thing is also unlikely to happen while this militaristic establishment has control over not just power but also over the Pakistani mind.

Indian threats and American pressures can bring about temporary reprieves now and then. But the final solution, the promise of peace, lies in changing this equation. India cannot do this alone. The international community mostly America cannot do it without India8217;s patience and understanding. It is vital, therefore, to engage these interlocutors again. This time, not with the usual FIRs on fresh infiltration, but with a larger game-plan. Or the next twist in policy would again be determined, for intensity as well as timing, by our anger on the provocation of some illiterate jehadi with a Kalashnikov.

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