Wrong start with wrong squad

From the first response given by a top police official to a reporter minutes after the Leopold firing on the incident probably being a 8220;gang war8221; to the fatigue suffered by almost all of Mumbai8217;s policemen by the end of the operation iquest; they would not have had any reinforcements if the siege had lasted another day iquest; it is emerging now that the Mumbai Police have some serious navel-gazing to do on their response to last month8217;s terror attack.

The force may have taken charge after several serial bomb blasts, but they were completely unprepared for this new form of attack: 8220;Continuous firing, hostage-taking and repeated grenade attacks,8221; described by one IPS official as 8220;a Halloween party that went from bad to worse8221;.

According to the Standard Operating Procedures SOP, the Commissioner of Police must hold such a meeting to evaluate the nature of the crisis and the immediate steps to be taken. Instead, what the city saw were suo-moto decisions by policemen, all undeniably brave and willing, but without any clarity on what their role would be.

According to the SOP for the police in the eventuality of a bomb blast or terror attack, it is the Joint Commissioner of Police Law and Order who must coordinate from the control room as the crisis management commander. However on November 26, it was Joint Commissioner of Police Crime who was stationed there. This is only one of various instances when the SOP 8212; meant to aid smooth functioning in a crisis8212;iquest; have remained only on paper.

Former IPS officer Y P Singh says: 8220;The SOP is supposed to be the blueprint of action for crisis situations and also involves drills to be followed. However it is rarely implemented. Instead of it being training for an emergency, it ends up being a formality with some cursory reports being filed.8221;

Like other poorly directed policemen, Assistant Commissioner of Police Isaque Bagwan had rushed to Nariman House with two constables after news spread that terrorists were holed up there. 8220;Initially, it was two constables and I who rushed to Nariman House but after grenade and RDX explosions, I called up the control for reinforcements. At one point, I had also requested for grenades to blow up a portion of a wall to gain entry into the building, but I was told that there weren8217;t any,8221; said Bagwan.

Elsewhere, Colaba policemen heard gunshots right opposite their police station, but rushed out unarmed, only to spot the gunmen and hurry back inside for their guns. 8220;There was no way we could have known that it was a terror attack. Hence we went unprepared to see what was happening. Therefore, despite spotting the terrorists, we weren8217;t able to immediately respond as we had left our guns at the station. By the time we rushed to get weapons and returned, the gunmen had already moved towards Taj,8221; said an official.

Then, while the terrorists had AK-47s and grenades, the Mumbai police had managed the first nine hours with guns, pistols and some carbines. It was only the Quick Response Team QRT of the Mumbai Police that had AK-47s.

To their credit, officials who were sent to take charge of the sites were those with some experience in handling extremists and naxals, like Deputy Commissioner of Police Rajvardhan and Additional Commissioner of Police Crime Deven Bharti who were heading the Taj operation and Additional Commissioner of Police Parambir Singh and Additional Commissioner of Police Sukhwinder Singh who were at the Oberoi.

Ill-equipped, though brave, the Mumbai Police might have found themselves at the wrong end of a tough situation, ruing lack of a drill or a plan for dealing with a crisis as large as this.