The militant8217;s trail

The timing of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee8217;s review of the security challenges in Jammu and Kashmir was appropriate. Just that Monday morning a newspaper had published an interview with Pakistan8217;s self-styled Chief Executive Pervez Musharraf, wherein he evidenced his resolve to make Kashmir the fulcrum of all Indo-Pak engagement. The coincidence thus occasioned an apt response from the Indian government. Pakistan8217;s intentions to up the ante in Kashmir have been blatantly obvious since Kargil. If the security forces are still to find their balance after their summer relocation in a successful effort to expel Pakistani intruders from the Kargil heights, the subsequent suicide attacks on army camps only seem to have further rattled the men in uniform. So a review of strategy is in order not only to seize the initiative, but also to rally a seemingly despondent and demoralised force around a tactically sound operation.

The basic points in the new counter-insurgency initiative agreed upon at the meetingare: the induction specialised battalions of paramilitary personnel; enhanced deployment on the immensely porous Line of Control; a security grid broken up into 49 sectors, and unified by a three-tier command and control structure. Certainly, lack of coordination between the plethora of paramilitary forces has been a major shortcoming in the fight against terrorism, as has been the oft perceived shortage of men. But the new strategy must also be augmented with a liberal dose of determination and foresight. The profile of the terrorist stalking the breathtakingly beautiful valleys and mountains of Jammu and Kashmir has drastically metamorphosed in recent years, and now the change is practically complete. Much more often than not he is likely to be from foreign lands, armed with the latest weaponry and driven by the monetary temptations or by visions of jehad as can be gauged from the fact that a majority of militants killed in the Valley of late are not Kashmiri. And if the spate of attacks on security campsis any indication, there has also been a sudden profusion of suicide squads willing to undertake frontal attacks and wreak as much destruction as possible before they are finally gunned down.

The question is, to what extent is it possible to counter this daredevilry infused into the proxy war. Given the recklessness and careless disregard for personal well-being which informs any suicide mission, it is virtually impossible to anticipate an attack. And even if a such an operation is anticipated, chances of countering it without sacrificing some casualties are practically nil. Hence, the bottomline is to cleanse the Valley of foreign mercenaries. No doubt, this is easier said than done. But any sincere counter-insurgency effort in that direction would involve tackling local alienation, which is so effortlessly exploited and reinforced by militants. That8217;s the tightrope which will have to be tread: thwarting the militant agenda with steely determination while managing the tragic fallout of crossfires themercenaries so thrive upon.