The charade on Iran

As American opponents of the Indo-US nuclear deal clutch at any straw in their final political onslaught against it, every half-baked news report from India on cooperation with Iran is whipped up in Washington as 8220;evidence8221; of New Delhi8217;s bad faith.

Both governments, however, know that there is less than meets the eye in the proclaimed strategic partnership between New Delhi and Tehran. Yet persistent posturing has created a potent set of political myths.

8226; Pipeline Myth: Despite all the political emotions it has whipped up, the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline is hardly strategic from New Delhi8217;s perspective. When he reversed years of the Indian establishment8217;s opposition to the IPI pipeline, Manmohan Singh saw it as an Indo-Pak political confidence building measure rather than as an answer to India8217;s energy problems. If Iran was incidental to this pipeline, Tehran has now made it difficult by quoting an exorbitant price for the gas. Pakistan, too, is demanding unreasonable transit fee.

Even if we can settle on the price, is the pipeline secure against the Baloch people8217;s threat to blow it up? Would India want to invest in downstream industries without reliable security guarantees from Pakistan?

With Iran under an expanding sanctions regime, it will be near impossible or too costly to raise the much needed international finance for the pipeline. In any case, India can always import liquefied natural gas from the Gulf, including Iran, in ships. Meanwhile, every time any American says 8216;no8217;, India will have to say 8216;yes8217; to a pipeline that might not take off in the near future.

8226; Energy Security Myth: This myth is built on a simple proposition that Iran is a major source of oil for India. According to some estimates, India now imports about 7 per cent of its annual oil requirements from Iran. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, supplies nearly 30 per cent of India8217;s supplies and has promised to do more to meet India8217;s energy security requirements. Iran today is not 8216;strategic8217; in any sense for India8217;s hydrocarbon imports. It could be in the future, if and when Tehran modernises its hydrocarbon policies and finds itself at peace with the region and the world. That is some distance away.

8226; Afghanistan Myth: Realists are right in recognising that Indo-Iranian political interests converged in their opposition to the Taliban and support to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan during the late 1990s. That was then. Now, India8217;s Afghan eggs are in the Hamid Karzai basket and New Delhi will have no reason in the future to abandon the Pushtuns to the mercy of Pakistan.

8226; Central Asia Myth: Although Iran could be India8217;s gateway to Eurasia, Tehran today has returned to the pitiful slogan of self-reliance rather than emphasise regional and global economic integration. India8217;s natural corridors to Afghanistan and Central Asia are through Pakistan. If the US, instead of complaining against New Delhi-Tehran ties, can agree to overland trade between India and Afghanistan, Iran8217;s weight in New Delhi8217;s geopolitical calculus would be much less salient.

Looking ahead, India8217;s challenge in South West Asia is not about saving Iran from the United States, but protecting New Delhi8217;s mounting interests in the Arab Gulf.

Amidst the floundering American intervention in Iraq, the single most important regional trend is the unfolding Saudi rivalry with Iran. Thanks to the American empowerment of the Shia majority in Iraq, the Sunni Arab regimes are now determined to balance the growing Iranian influence in Baghdad.

In the new struggle between Riyadh and Tehran, Arabs and Persians, and the Sunni and Shia, you could bet your bottom dollar India will inevitably gravitate towards the former. India has barely 300 families living in Iran, while nearly five million Indians work in the Arab Gulf, who save and remit home billions of dollars. India8217;s trade with GCC is nearly six times larger than that with Iran and growing much faster.

Together the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council constitute India8217;s single biggest source of imported oil, one of the top destinations for India8217;s exports, and increasingly important source of foreign direct investment. India8217;s expanding defence ties with the Arab Gulf are far more consequential than the nominal security engagement with Iran.

In the current domestic play on Iran, few will take New Delhi to task for neglecting the Arab Gulf. Would any one ask why six long years have elapsed between Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh8217;s visit to Saudi Arabia in January 2001 and the one now planned by Pranab Mukherjee? Or, why hasn8217;t Prime Minister Manmohan Singh found time to visit the Arab Gulf even once in the last three years? When domestic politics envelops a foreign policy debate, facts cease to be important.

By its sheer location, resources, and history, Iran will always be the prize of the Gulf. But until it changes the current internal orientation and finds external harmony, Iran8217;s relations with India will remain underwhelming.

Many in Washington and New Delhi, for their own particular reasons, will continue to exaggerate the significance of the Indo-Iranian engagement. The absurdity of Indo-US word play on Iran is redeemed, however, by its irrelevance to the new power play in the Gulf.

The writer is professor at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore