Text in context

A collateral benefit of the political gamesmanship that has taken place on the Indo-US nuclear deal is the amazing popular literacy on the subject. So, even as political controversy swirled over the manner in which the draft of the India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA was made available online, assorted, non-technical voices conceded that it is a very good draft. What occasions this satisfaction? First, the safeguards agreement8217;s consistency with the 123 agreement and the separation plan makes it a sustainable document. Two, it recognises India8217;s nuclear weapons programme. Three, and extremely significantly, it addresses India8217;s apprehensions on disruption of supplies, fears that come from memories of the Tarapur atomic power station. And taken together, the big picture accommodates India8217;s aspirations and actual role as a partner in the management of the global order.

How are Indian apprehensions about disruption of supplies being met? Articles 71-75 of the safeguards agreement specify procedures for safeguarding stockpiles of source material in a sealed storage facility. Normally, most countries are offered reasonable reactor requirements. It is interesting that Barack Obama was unsuccessful when he moved an amendment to the Hyde Act in the US Congress to bind India to the norm. Article 79-84 have provisions for reprocessing fuel, for both safeguarded and unsafeguarded reactors. Article 94 provides ways of using safeguarded nuclear material in all or part of a facility marked as unsafeguarded. That is, India could choose to augment its nuclear energy availability by using unsafeguarded reactors for power. In addition, India has some very India-specific assurances on fuel supply that are not usually provided to other signatories. For instance, the IAEA will have to make a special report in case India reports disruption of supplies, though the agency is not otherwise a fuel supply guarantor.

There have been misgivings voiced on the way India8217;s right to take corrective measures has been framed 8212; from both domestic critics of the nuclear deal and non-proliferationists overseas. These are unfounded. The right to take corrective measures has been deliberately left vague to give India latitude to determine what those measures may be, depending on the politics of the day. The point is that this provision should not be seen as an indication that the agreement is being programmed to deal with its own collapse. Both India and the rest of the world come to the nuclear deal with past baggage. Indians are simply too familiar with the lurch they found themselves in in the 8217;70s. Therefore, we need the assurances of solutions in case of cessation of supplies. The world is looking for guarantees that we will abide by our word. And both must know that, with imminent interdependence, the stakes will be too high for a breakdown.