Reactive to proactive

The Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Brajesh Mishra, established contact with France and Russia. JaswantSingh opened a dialogue with the Americans. Singh utilised the ASEAN Ministerial Conference in Manila in July to meet Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and began the process of controlling the damage to bilateral relations from the defence minister8217;s statements and Vajpayee8217;s naming China as the threat leading to nuclear weaponisation.

Vajpayee, while reaffirming India8217;s commitment to disarmament and non-discriminatory non-proliferation, categorically declared that India would not roll back its weapons and missile capacities. At the same time in Parliament and at the UN General Assembly, he conveyed willingness to join the mainstream of non-proliferation negotiations structured on practical, non-discriminatory and purposeful terms of reference.

The deliberate ambiguity on signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT and participation in talks on the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty FMCT has caused confusion in Indian public opinion. A clear indication about our plans and the rationale forgovernment policies is necessary.

India8217;s individual discussions on nuclear weaponisation, non-proliferation and broader security and strategic issues with the US, France and Russia have progressed satisfactorily. While there are no indications of the nuclear powers accommodating our concerns or adjusting fully to the declared directions of Indian nuclear and missile policies, these exchanges have certainly convinced them that our nuclear weaponisation is not adventurism: that India will not succumb to external pressures about its fundamental interests nor will it erode the capacities it has acquired. Another ground reality which the international community is gradually accepting is that India has the grit and stamina to face economic and technological sanctions.

There is a discernible shift away from punitive and containment policies to constructive engagement of India, manifest in the continuing dialogue with the US and the talks that Singh, George Fernandes and Mishra have had with their counterpartsin Britain, France and Russia. The substantive political and technical dialogue is continuing with the US. Statements by Strobe Talbott and Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth to the US Congressional Committees after the last round of Indo-US talks indicate that talks on non-proliferation and security issues offer scope for accommodation despite some basic differences which cannot be overcome.

Political and diplomatic exchanges with Russia and France have been followed by technical discussions on substantive issues of weaponisation and missile capacities. Russian Prime Minister Primakov8217;s visit to Delhi late last year and Fernandes8217; visit to France this year have led to decisions on expanding defence cooperation with these nuclear powers. These countries are willing to deal with India on the basis of political and technological realities rather than being inhibited by irrelevant legal and formal advocacies based on clauses of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Indications by the US Vice-Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Ralston, that the US is willing to revive consultations in the Indo-US Defence Policy Group and recommence some categories of military cooperation show that even America accepts that isolating India completely will be counter-productive. This does not mean that Washin-gton is not determined to cap India8217;s capacities and keep on the pressure for a roll-back.

The approach seems to be to persuade India to fall in line through political engagement and diplomatic dialogue. This process is bound to reach a saturation point in the foreseeable future, and that is when India8217;s capacity to remain firm about its interests and America8217;s ability to adjust to the bottomline of the Indian bargaining position would be put to the test. One hopes that the US will be practical and responsible at that time.

Initiatives in relations with China, Japan and ASEAN have had encouraging results. Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath8217;s discussions in the Japanese Foreign Office in mid-January have reducedbilateral tensions and Japanese misunderstandings about weaponisation. Japan remaining critical is more a result of its domestic political and regional strategic concerns.

The dialogue with China has been revived though it is very slow. Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan has indicated that meetings of the Joint Working Group on the boundary issue could be re-started. An Indian delegation succeeded, in Asian Regional Forum ARF meetings, in forging consensus on regional security and non-proliferation issues despite ASEAN reservations about our weaponisation.

The Deputy Prime Ministers of UK and Australia visited India in March, pulling back from an irrational initial condemnatory stance. The US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State branched off from the delegation of Madeleine Albright in Beijing to come and brief India on the evolving US political-strategic perceptions.

There is a visible reduction in the publicity campaign against India worldwide. Vajpayee8217;s visit to Pakistan and the Memorandum ofUnderstanding with Pakistan on strategic restraint have clearly made a positive impact on international public opinion and in the Chancelleries of important powers. This is a welcome development even if Vajpayee8217;s initiative does not result in immediate qualitative improvement in bilateral relations.

This does not mean that it will be smooth sailing henceforth. A proactive foreign policy must continue. But a measure of satisfaction is due that we did not remain stuck in the doldrums of reactive diplomacy. The Vajpayee Government merits encouragement in the processes it has adopted.