Peace, not ceasefire

Then came the transfer of 40 acres of forest land to the Amarnath Shrine Board. First, there were a few routine political statements, opposing the government move. And then, the entire Valley rose in protest, bringing life to a sudden halt. Hundreds of thousands came out on the streets. There were processions. There was violence too but, this time, stones had replaced bullets. These protests, however, were spontaneous, taking even astute observers by surprise.

Suddenly, the situation in Kashmir was reminiscent of the turbulent 8217;90s. Interestingly, those protesting were not divided by class, ideology or party affiliation: they were just very angry young people. The stone-pelting, slogan-shouting first ranks were formed of young men between 15 and 25. Even larger protests 8212; some of 50,000 people 8212; took place in remote rural areas that had been quiet for years, including in places with a traditionally close relationship with the army.

What happened might be surprising, but not really unexpected. Everyone was positive about the situation on the ground: New Delhi, Pakistan and the state government. The moderate agenda of the Hurriyat and that of the PDP were beginning to overlap; the Congress was obsessed with 8220;development8221;, and the 2008 polls were expected to provide closure. Moderate separatists had lost much relevance, waiting indefinitely for the invitation to a second round of talks after the big photo-op. The mistake lay in assuming that the declining credibility of the separatist leadership implied a decline in separatist sentiment as well.

While the government had been expecting that the calm would automatically heal the wounds of 18 years, Kashmir was silently waiting for a concrete mechanism to bring closure to its pain. The expose of mass graves in Baramulla and Kupwara had once again strengthened the demand that thousands of families here still need answers and it is the government8217;s responsibility to make it possible. Two years of a substantial calm had provided the government with enough time to think and come up with a concrete plan to address the demands of justice. This would have provided a base for a real political process on the ground based on a true engagement rather than a game of dialogue, revolving around mutual gimmickry. The only unambiguous aspect of New Delhi8217;s Kashmir policy has been to delay confronting real problems, and now Islamabad too has taken a similar line. Still, the presence and strength of security forces was never made proportional to the declining graph of violence or the security establishment8217;s own assessment of the militant presence on the ground.

Though the emotive issue of land ownership acted as the trigger, the real reason for mass anger is the perception that the political status quo is being traded officially as a permanent solution to the conflict. This uprising should have established before those formulating Kashmir policy in New Delhi and Islamabad that the Kashmir problem has its epicentre primarily in Kashmir, and so a solution will come only out of Kashmir. The obsession to look for answers in Islamabad, or through engaging a Kashmiri leadership closer to Pakistan, will never help resolve anything on the ground. The complexion of the protestors, especially their age group, their anger and their motivation, is itself a new phenomenon. It is a new and harsh reality that needs to be immediately understood so that we do not encounter another wave of thousands of angry young men taking to Kalashnikovs. This nine-day uprising has been a wake-up call: absence of war does not necessarily mean peace; and unless the issue is resolved permanently, we will always get the feel of a temporary ceasefire.

muzamil.jaleelexpressindia.com