Losing the peace plot

If the fear of entering uncharted waters extends to the implementation of the nuclear pact with the United States and making a choice in Vienna on Iran8217;s nuclear proliferation at the end of this month, there won8217;t be much intellectual excitement or credibility left in UPA8217;s foreign policy.

As the opposition and sections of the UPA itself prepare to mount relentless attacks in the next session of the Parliament 8212; from the Natwar Singh episode to India8217;s IAEA vote against Iran 8212; the temptation to play safe might only increase.

A little over three months ago, when he was defending the historic but controversial nuclear pact with the US in Parliament, Manmohan Singh emphasised the importance of taking risks in foreign policy.8221;In life nothing is very certain. I think we have all to work on the assumption that things ex post facto may not turn out to be what they appear to be in sight. We must, therefore, take precautions. But not to take risks would also be an act of lethargy.8221;

Conceding the ambiguities in the nuclear pact he signed with the Bush administration during his visit to Washington in July, Singh added, 8220;If there are risks, those are calculated risks; they are worth taking.8221;

The nuclear pact was not the first occasion when Singh took risks. During his first trip the United Nations as prime minister in September 2004, he bet that the Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf was a man he 8220;could do business with8221;. Going against the advice of the establishment, he chose to invite Musharraf to India in April 2005 for a full-fledged visit and not merely cricket diplomacy. These moves paid off handsomely and opened up a lot of space for creative Indian engagement with Pakistan, especially on Jammu and Kashmir.

As he oversaw unprecedented changes in Kashmir, including the launch of the bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, Singh8217;s call for 8220;thinking out of the box8221; on Kashmir began to gain ground.

But by the time he met Musharraf again in New York in September 2005, caution once again came in the way of experimenting with Pakistan policy. PM8217;s initiatives on solving Siachen and exploring the prospects for a ceasefire and troop reduction in Kashmir were put on hold.

While the all-shattering earthquake provided new opportunities for Indian diplomacy with Pakistan in Kashmir, the limits of government8217;s strategic imagination have begun to constrain India8217;s diplomatic possibilities.

After that, it just took one brutal act of terrorism in the Capital to take the chutzpah out of India8217;s quake diplomacy with Pakistan. Although India held its peace and did not blame Pakistan for the bombings, and went ahead with the talks on opening the Line of Control in J038;K, Delhi8217;s quake diplomacy has begun to lose steam.

Given the bitter past in Kashmir, the opening of five new points of contact between India and Pakistan along the LoC looks revolutionary on the face of it; at the functional level, however, it is in the danger becoming a trivial pursuit.

Concerns about terrorists taking advantage have prevented India from accepting an easy movement of people across the Line of Control. By insisting that lists of people have to exchanged and their bonafides verified before letting them cross the LoC, India has left desperate relatives on both sides of the divide deeply disappointed.

Worse still, quake diplomacy appears to be losing its strategic and tactical purpose 8212; to affect a fundamental change in the ground reality in Kashmir over the longer term and win influence on the other side in the short term.

It was India which initiated the quake diplomacy. It compelled Musharraf under pressure at home for inept relief operations to respond. Yet when Musharraf finally came around to accepting the Indian proposals on making the LoC irrelevant, it is India that is holding back.

The terrorists have clearly succeeded in preventing India from doing what is in its own best interests. If there were any doubts, the new approach was reaffirmed after Singh met Pakistani premier Shaukat Aziz in Dhaka on the margins of the South Asian summit.

Singh declared that India would consider either demilitarisation or any redeployment of troops in Kashmir only after cross-border terrorism comes to a complete halt.

Are force reductions in Kashmir a favour from India to Pakistan or does it also take into account the demands from the people of Jammu and Kashmir? Isn8217;t changing the political dynamic in J038;K part of the counter-terror strategy?

Violence always complicates any peace process. It is also true that Pakistan should not be allowed the luxury of negotiating with India with a gun on the table. But while India must maintain the diplomatic pressure on Pakistan, what options does it have other than slowing down the peace process or pulling out of it? Will such a decision put an end to terrorism? Should India prepare for another Operation Parakram if terrorist violence continues after we cut short the peace process?

Continuing cross-border violence deserves a sophisticated policy response, that must include a recasting of the doctrine, organisation, command and control of India8217;s counter-terror operations. However, merely wrapping intellectual lethargy in hard line rhetoric against Pakistan could prove to be disastrous.