Fixed it, shut it, can146;t forget it

In many ways, the biggest loser on polling day was the intelligence-military establishment, which feels it has a monopoly over defining Pakistan8217;s national interest. The establishment did everything in its power to keep out mainstream political parties8212;the Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan Muslim League N. It helped create the PML8217;s QA faction and helped it gain a majority. Its maneuvers disillusioned most voters, resulting in a low turnout. But those who did bother to go to polling stations also cast a vote against the establishment. The combined votes of the opposition parties outnumber those of the King8217;s party and other pro-Musharraf factions.

The MMA benefited from the anti-American sentiment among the Pashtuns in the provinces bordering Afghanistan. General Musharraf would have been able to cash in this fact in Washington if his own policies had not contributed to the MMA8217;s success. The state8217;s relentless propaganda against the main parties and their leadership, coupled with the public8217;s lack of empathy with the King8217;s party, left the religious groups as the only untried group for the people to turn to.

Unlike the PPP and PML-N, the MMA had no hurdles put in its path by the military regime. None of its leaders faced disqualification, none were in exile and none could be described on state TV as 8216;8216;looters and plunderers8217;8217;. The establishment8217;s fantastic dream that the King8217;s party should fill the vacuum it created was unacceptable to the people. The religious parties offer the 8216;8216;new faces8217;8217; Musharraf so much wanted from the political process.

While the vote for the MMA should alarm Musharraf and his associates, it need not bother the world, unless the Pakistani establishment manipulates it for strategic advantage. Pakistan8217;s religious parties have been around for a long time and their leaders have shown flexibility in political matters. Unless they are pushed in the wrong direction by the establishment, they can be expected to be pragmatic in parliamentary politics.

These groups were in politics long before jihadi militancy was introduced in the aftermath of the anti-Soviet Afghan operation and Kashmiri militancy. The politics of Islamic identity, rather than violence and militancy, was the hallmark of religious parties until the 1980s. It may be in Pakistan8217;s interest to help the religious parties revert to the political, as opposed to the militant, phase of Islamic revivalism. If, however, Musharraf tries to gain advantage in Washington by using the MMA8217;s success as an alarm bell, there could be increased militancy fomented by covert groups.

The October 10 election was not the first time that the people surprised a Pakistani military leader at the ballot box. In 1970, General Yahya Khan8217;s plan for a hung parliament was foiled by the clear victories of the Awami League in East Pakistan and the PPP in West Pakistan. In 1985, General Zia8217;s appeal to return more pious parliamentarians was not heeded and most of his cabinet ministers seeking election were defeated.

The electorate, it seems votes in the opposite direction of the 8216;8216;guidelines8217;8217; given to it by its military rulers. Zia wanted the election of more religious people while Musharraf sought a secular parliament. On both occasions, the people8217;s wisdom ran contrary to that of the self-imposed patriarchs.

The European Union Chief Election observer, John Cushnahan, summed up Pakistan8217;s political problem when he declared, 8216;8216;The holding of a general election does not in itself guarantee the establishment of a democracy.8217;8217; The government spokesman8217;s response to the EU8217;s report has been, typically, unimaginative. Instead of a letter of resignation from the Chief Election Commissioner who as Supreme Court Chief Justice had legitimised General Musharraf8217;s military takeover, we got 8216;8216;the statement is baseless8217;8217; comment that has become the hallmark of official statements in Pakistan.

Having been in the unhappy position of a government spokesman in Pakistan myself, I know the limitations of the job well. Pakistani officials have, over time, described Bengali political activists as 8216;8216;miscreants8217;8217; in 1971; denied that the country was being used as a base of operations for Afghan Mujahideen during the anti-Soviet resistance; denied that the country was developing nuclear weapons throughout the 1980s and early 1990s; and denied that there are any restrictions on free expression or free politics through much of the country8217;s independent existence.

Musharraf can draw some comfort from the lack of criticism of the Pakistani election by the US. But it is only a matter of time before the US joins the European Union in recognising that the election was seriously flawed. There may also be implications for India-Pakistan relations, which in turn will invite US concern.

Instead of drawing up imaginary maps and strategic designs about Pakistan8217;s politics and then imposing them on the nation, the military leaders should be content with doing their own job well. And leave politics to politicians, however flawed and allegedly incompetent they might be.