Different pay for different folks

But India8217;s is not the only army plagued by severe manpower problems. A recent report in The Economist cites the experience of the US army. An estimate suggests that while around 35 per cent of the class of 2000 from the elite West Point Academy quit within five years, this figure had already risen to 58 per cent in 2002. The report suggests that the shortage of officers is mostly at the junior levels of captains and majors, a problem similar to that of the Indian army. The US government has increased the minimum age of entry to 42 in an attempt to address the problem. A recent article in The Guardian reported that the British army has introduced a bursary scheme for those leaving school and wishing to join the military to gain a relevant degree. This is in a bid to attract better talent 8212; a ministry of defence report of 2004 suggested that the average British soldier had a reading age of 11. The minimum age for recruitment has been raised from 26 to 33 and soldiers who have left are being offered monetary incentives to rejoin.

In short, a career in the armed forces is not an attractive proposition in a lot of countries. One of the reasons for this is inadequate pay for what is very risky work. Economics dictates that bankers and entrepreneurs receive stupendous compensation for the risks they take. But, unlike army officers, they don8217;t lose their lives if they fail. Armies do not work for profit even if they undertake risky work. Still, the government must ensure that they receive adequate returns. Perhaps those posted in conflict zones could receive a substantial bonus. Of course, it doesn8217;t help in the way of attracting talent that the Indian army has one of the highest rates of officer casualties in the world. The continuous low-level conflicts in Kashmir and the Northeast increase the likelihood of serious injury or death while on the job. In the long run, the government must find political solutions to these conflicts.

In the short run, however, the first step in improving the lot of the Indian armed forces should be to de-link not only the pay but also the stature of the armed forces from their civilian counterparts. Given the completely different nature of work, hierarchy, career prospects and the talent required, it makes little sense to have a one-to-one parity: How can one equate a major-general with 30 years of service with a joint secretary who has 17 years under his belt? There is also the problem of the sharp pyramid-like structure of the forces 8212; only 3 per cent of officers make the rank of major-general whereas nearly all IAS officers make the rank of joint secretary. Since it is difficult to change that structure, it makes sense to have a different compensation package where colonels, majors and captains 8212; posts in which officers have to serve for long, and where the shortages are most acute 8212; can be paid better. Not surprisingly, most of the complaints about inadequate pay have come from the junior ranks.

The government, and especially the review committee, should also consider other measures to make a military career more attractive. The government may finance officers in the rank of colonel in acquiring other professional degrees, such as MBAs, so that those who don8217;t get promoted can leave. This may also be an incentive for captains and majors to stay on till they become colonels. There is also a strong case for fast-tracking the promotion of the best officers. That is one way of retaining the best, while ensuring that comparatively younger officers occupy important field jobs.

At a more general level, the state has to invest much more than it currently does in India8217;s large pool of illiterate and ill-educated people to increase the supply of skilled workers for different professions. That will ensure that the pool from which India8217;s competing employers draw their stock continues to expand.

The writer researches India8217;s political economy at Trinity College, Cambridge dn234cam.ac.uk