
In recent weeks, the media and many commentators on defence issues have had a field day reporting and commenting on what was perceived as a stand-off between the military and civilian establishments, culminating in the unfortunate summary dismissal of the erstwhile Chief of the Naval Staff. Sadly, one could even detect in some of the reports and comments, a tinge almost of an acceptance of inevitability, a conclusion that this last bulwark of our democratic structure was also falling prey to erosion of the basic values enshrined in our Constitution.
As one who has had the privilege of serving in uniform for just under 40 years, and continues to have a major stake in the well-being of the Indian armed forces by virtue of the fact that my son is a young lieutenant in the Army, in the very same battalion into which I was commissioned over four decades ago, I make bold to state that the Indian armed forces are not yet affected at the core by what has been going on at the top levels of the hierarchy.
Ourtroops deployed in combating insurgency in operational areas in Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast, those deployed along the northern borders in Ladakh, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, as also those in peace stations, continue to perform their allotted tasks with the same degree of dedication, application, determination and enthusiasm, as ever before. It is a matter of some sadness, therefore, that, while so much is being made of the events that are the subject of sensationalism, this aspect has not been highlighted in the media and in the comments that abound.
There can be no doubt, even among sceptics, that the decision to dismiss Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat must have been a most difficult one; I would suggest that this would have been more difficult than the decision to undertake the nuclear tests at Pokharan. One can only hope that this was better thought through than the one in May 1998, inasmuch as its repercussions and the need to institute measures to prevent recurrence to the extent feasible of theevents that led to such a drastic decision are recognised.
For, if the opportunity provided by this display of what is perceived as firm action by the government of the day without any comments on the merits or demerits of the decision is not followed up with the necessary institutional remedial measures, the adverse 8220;fallout8221; could be more disastrous than that of the avoidable fiasco that has followed the conduct of the nuclear tests. This means that the basic issues that have bedevilled civil-military relations must be addressed without any further delay.
The stranglehold of the civilian bureaucracy must be broken; it cannot be allowed to continue. No one in uniform has any doubt whatsoever that, in our system of governance, political authority is supreme, in the form of Parliament, and the government of the day; and that this must continue.
The resentment has always been that such authority has been delegated by the political masters to the bureaucracy; which, in the eyes of the uniformed man,wields all the authority, without any accountability whatsoever.
Particularly, when the military leader is directly accountable to his troops, who quite unquestioningly, lay their lives on the line, when called upon to do so. Surely our troops, who are second to none in the world, deserve a better deal.
What this really means is that the Service Chiefs must have direct, unfettered access to the political authority, in the form of the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister, on a regular basis. We understand that the present Defence Minister has instituted the system of weekly meetings with the Service Chiefs together with others. This is fine and must continue. But, allow me to suggest that it is equally important, if not more so, that the Service Chiefs meet the Defence Minister individually, at least once a week, and the Prime Minister, about once a fortnight, if not once a week.
These are the only occasions on which a Service Chief can express himself on sensitive issues which he would feelconstrained to talk about in the presence of his other colleagues and members of the civilian bureaucracy. This really is how the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister should be keeping a finger on the pulse of the only segment of our establishment that could prevent us from sliding into total anarchy.
To go a step further no doubt this is being done in some unstructured form even now, given the conditions under which the Indian Army operates in Jammu and Kashmir, and in the Northeast, it is vital that, besides having one-on-one8217; discussions with the Defence Minister as often as is necessary, the Chief of the Army Staff must together with the Defence Minister if he is available, meet similarly on at least a weekly basis with the Prime Minister. This is the only way the political hierarchy can hear unfiltered views. Whether they wish to accept the views and advice, is entirely their political privilege; but at least any decision they take, or decline to take, will not suffer from lack of direct inputson matters that concern national security. This arrangement is something that can be put into practice without a moment8217;s delay, and should be implemented, notwithstanding the manner in which the new national security apparatus that has been set up, implements its charter.
The other vital aspect which needs immediate attention is that of a radical restructuring of the Ministry of Defence and the three Service Headquarters. There is no point tinkering with various options that have been suggested at one forum or another. A very detailed study was undertaken almost a decade ago by a group of experienced, dedicated, and competent individuals from various disciplines of the strategic community, and a comprehensive report submitted to the then government.
It remains still-born due to the utter obduracy and arrogance of the civilian bureaucracy, which does not wish to see an erosion of its powers over the defence establishment in general, and the uniformed fraternity in particular. The time for prevarication isover. The developments over the last couple of weeks do not permit any further procrastination.
I suggest that the report of the Arun Singh Committee be taken out of the archives to which it appears to have been consigned, and dusted, reviewed and implemented; mid-course corrections can be applied as inadequacies are revealed through experience. A retired Lieutenant General, Nambiar headed the UN peackeeeping force in Bosnia