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This is an archive article published on January 16, 1999

Battling the Valley war

An officer recently voiced the dilemma the Army is facing in Kashmir: Is a group of emotionally swayed people to be considered innocent...

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An officer recently voiced the dilemma the Army is facing in Kashmir: 8220;Is a group of emotionally swayed people to be considered innocent civilians or active militants? Is it more important to avoid civilian casualties or to assert authority?8221;

Commanding a troop against militants in Bhaderwah, he had chosen the former. Faced with a group of 100 people shouting anti-Army slogans around a house where militants were hiding, he had retreated. And earned interrogation by his seniors.

However, few in the Valley can answer the questions raised by him. Still fewer doubt the effect the protracted low-key warfare in Kashmir is having on the attitude of Army officials.

An undefined enemy; civilian supporters of militants, known as Over Ground Workers OGWs in defence parlance; and constant charges of human rights violations have all added to the predicament of officials engaged in counter-insurgency operations. Various case studies conducted by the Army in militant-infested Doda district have revealed thatofficials trained in conventional warfare, where the orders are to shoot to kill, are finding it extremely strenuous to adjust to the much low-intensity battle, where they are told to avoid force as long as possible.

As General Officer Commanding GOC, Delta Force, Major General G.S. Brar warned at a recent seminar on human rights in Jammu, 8220;The changes are going to be extremely disastrous for the forces in case of a conventional war.8221; Counter-insurgency experts point out that given the 8220;localised8221; element to the battle in the Valley, the Army has to take care to avoid any collateral damage, stretching its resources and men.

8220;For instance, if we receive information that a militant is hiding in a house in a highly populated civilian area, we have to plan our operation accordingly,8221; an officer notes. 8220;Troops tend to become over cautious and instead of spending just an hour to eliminate militants, it takes us sometimes more then six hours.8221;

While the loss of less innocent lives is welcome, itcan prove dangerous for the jawans. An officer in Doda gives the example of a recent Bhaderwah encounter in which the Army came to know of a militant hiding in a house adjacent to a mosque and decided to act in the early hours of the day. The operation ultimately lasted 13 hours as hasty action could have resulted in civilian deaths. 8220;But is it worth it?8221; an officer asks. 8220;If it takes six hours for a unit to eliminate just one militant, the jawans and their commanding officers are obviously going to be stressed more.8221; Besides being exposed to danger, under such stressful conditions, for longer.

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Army officials also point out that as militants acquire more sophisticated weapons, it is becoming increasingly difficult to stick to the low-risk method.

Another matter that disheartens the soldiers is the clamour of human rights. Many say the OGWs 8212; who are believed to have good political connections 8212; are themselves behind many of these allegations. Others point out that the ghost of human rights groupshaunting the men makes them over-cautious, sometimes with disastrous consequences.

After the Champnari massacre in which 26 civilians were killed, the Army had launched a two-pronged operation. While several officials had gone after the militants, others had fanned out to minority pockets to stop panic migration. Officials say within 24 hours of the massacre, they had received information that the killers had taken shelter in the house of a militant sympathiser about 10 km from the massacre site in Susawar forests. 8220;The troops picked up the harbourer, but they were over-cautious while extracting information about the militants fearing allegations of human rights,8221; recalls General Brar. 8220;The result was real time was lost and the operation called off with no success. It was a setback to the morale of the forces.8221;

Earlier, a successful unit of Rashtriya Rifles had almost gone into hibernation after an inquiry was ordered against a colonel, major and two junior commissioned officers, who apparently werethe inspirations of the unit, for human right violations. During this period, the Champnari massacre took place.

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A probe found that the morale of the forces had dipped after the institution of the inquiry. Sources say when the officials were exonerated of the charges in October 1998, the unit again started showing results.

Armymen, in fact, insist that the number of human rights cases against an official is directly linked to the success achieved by the unit under him. They say they are aware of the importance of these rights and have refined operational tactics to guard against violations, but that the rights bodies which go to town over alleged excesses by security forces should also condemn those who lodge fake cases.

 

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