An elephant8217;s memory

According to conventional wisdom, these developments can be considered anticlimactic since Sri Lankan government and LTTE representatives were expected to commence negotiations in Europe through Norwegian mediation.A measure of background information and historical memory should, however, have made all concerned anticipate a significant military initiative from the LTTE before negotiations commenced. Instead of agreeing to commence the dialogue immediately, both the Kumaratunga government and the LTTE had stipulated parallel pre-conditions. The government demanded complete cessation of LTTE operations, whereas the LTTE demanded cessation of the Sri Lankan military offensive and withdrawal of Sri Lankan forces south of the Elephant Pass. Given the political and military orientations of both sides, it was obvious that these demands would not be met. There might have been some tactical lull in fighting engineered by the LTTE in preparation for the massive assault which resulted in the capture of the Elephant Pass, displacement of the Sri Lankan army north and south of the pass and bottling up of government forces in Jaffna town.

The LTTE8217;s military objective now is to consolidate its domination of the Jaffna Peninsula and its political aim is to enter the negotiations from a position of strengthened credibility based on territorial control of Tamil areas of Sri Lanka. While the LTTE is incrementally dominating the peninsula, it is also effective in questioning the government8217;s jurisdiction in Trincomalee, Baticaloa and Amperai.

The developments in the second fortnight of April were a culmination of the critical predicament faced by the Sri Lankan government. President Chandrika Kumaratunga was subjected to a suicide bomb attack in December 1999. The LTTE8217;s military pressure in Jaffna increased between January and March and Kumaratunga ordered her three service chiefs to locate themselves in Jaffna to personally command operations. But this did not serve the purpose of boosting the morale and determination of the Lankan forces. The fall of Elephant Pass and Iyakachchi means that the LTTE is now in control of the main land route from the rest of Sri Lanka to the Jaffna Peninsula. Parallel to this, the LTTE8217;s capacity to disrupt land and sea communications as well as the administration in the eastern provinces remains unchallenged.

The emerging situation in Sri Lanka, therefore, is that of the LTTE going in for the Norwegian-sponsored negotiations in a militarily and politically assertive mood while the Sri La-nkan government would either be on the defensive or would be in the process of launching a military onslaught that is, if negotiations can take place at all in such a situation. Kumaratunga has undertaken consultations with opposition parties and, more importantly, with the Buddhists about the sta-nce to be adopted by the government in the negotiations. These have not been encouraging. The main opposition party, the UNP, is critical of the fact that the government did not have any detailed discussions with the opposition before formally accepting the Norwegian initiative. The two main Buddhist religious leaders indicated to Kumarat-unga that they have reservations about the Norwegian initiative in the context of developments over the last year.

While the LTTE has indicated a willingness to participate in negotiations through Norwegian mediation, their objective remains to see that all their fundamental demands are fully met by the Sri Lankan government. If talks do not achieve this purpose, the LTTE may dissociate itself from the process. More so now when they seem to have the upper hand. It must be noted that preparatory consultations on the Norwegian initiative were interrupted, with Kumaratunga going abroad for medical treatment.

Apart from the critical military situation that the Sri Lankan government faces, its ramification in terms of internal politics creates additional problems for the stability of the country. Future prospects, therefore, have to be assessed not only in the above context, but also in terms of the overall politico-military situation. The Lankan forces have been under continuous military pressure for the last five years, which they have not been able to cope with despite some interim successes. There are reports of desertions and low morale, in contrast to the LTTE cadres8217; commitment and battle-hardened determination. It is interesting to note that the LTTE has acquired weapons capable of shooting down aircraft. They are also becoming incrementally effective in operations at sea. Despite being a secessionist organisation, they do not seem to be short of finances or arms.

A critical dimension affecting India in this whole situation is the fact that despite being an organisation banned by the Government of India, the LTTE retains its extensive political and logistical connections in Tamil Nadu and along the coasts, including the ports of Rameshwaram and Vedaranyam. Recent reports indicate that areas in Tamil Nadu still serve as bases for supplies and logistical support to the LTTE.

India has to cope with three problems in its Sri Lankan policy at this stage. First, to deal with the LTTE connections in Tamil Nadu which affect the state8217;s security. Second, there is the continuous trickle of refugees from Sri Lanka. And third, to respond to Sri Lankan concerns about the first factor and sustain stability in Indo-Sri Lankan relations. Despite suggestions from some quarters, it is obvious that India should not get involved in any direct mediation efforts in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless the LTTE8217;s military success in threatening the dismemberment of Sri Lanka also has serious political implications for India. We can certainly suggest that Sri Lanka seriously consider responding to Tamil aspirations short of accepting division of the country, if that is possible.