An agenda for the defence minister

The problem with the defence budget is not just that less money is allotted but that most of what is budgeted goes in maintaining the existing manpower and equipment. The revenue budget of the Indian Army is hovering around a dangerous 85 percent of the total allocation. Pay and allowances of the men take a large slice of 55 percent and leave a pittance for modernisation. The answer is either to investigate avenues of reducing the revenue expenditure or to allot ever-larger amounts to the unproductive sector of defence.

What India will have to spend on defence will, to a large extent, depend on the relationship we will have in the coming years with Pakistan. Despite periodic warnings from the IMF, Pakistan continues to spend over 7 percent of the GDP on its defence. In fact, the two neighbours are drowning in a sea of defence expenditure, and going down lower each year in the world’s list of human development records.

The new government cannot put off the decisionon the signing of the CTBT. Experts say that we have, after Pokharan II, gathered enough data to be able to simulate all nuclear tests in a laboratory. The problem then is not a technical one. In fact, it is generally agreed that there is now no harm in signing the CTBT. By now, India has more or less been accepted as a member of the nuclear club. The main question is what we can get out of offering our precious signature. At best, it can be US support for our efforts to get a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. At worst, the lifting of the sanctions and resumption of aid. It is now a simple matter of haggling before we sign the document.

The new government also needs to address itself to the entire nuclear issue. It will be fair to admit that the fallout of Pokharan II has not been as expected. Neither has nuclearisation led to any cutting down of the conventional forces nor has it proved to be a deterrent. It is now obvious that neither of these can be expected. Indeed, post-Kargil, the move isalready afoot to increase the size of the para-military forces. The National Security Council has produced what has been touted as “India’s first strategic doctrine.” The government wants a national debate on the paper. Unfortunately, any debate in India is confined to the dozen odd experts within a mile of the South Block. The most urgent agenda before a new government is to educate India’s masses on nuclear warfare. It is necessary to show films like The Day After to India’s innocent public. The hubris, euphoria and jingoism may die when it is realised that 30 lakh people in Delhi or Mumbai will die after just one device is exploded over these cities. It will also stop irresponsible calls by political parties to “nuke the enemy.”

The long-needed reform required in the country’s higher command organisation as well as in the defence headquarters is another issue which requires attention. After the Bhagwat episode George Fernandes promised to bring about these reforms “within a month”. Nothinghas happened. Except for introducing a wishy washy National Security Council the old government had little to show in way of reforms. Kargil clearly showed that the NSC in its present form is neither effective nor useful. The Subrahmanyam Committee report on Kargil is due. Will the report be made public and properly debated in Parliament?

The new defence minister has his agenda cut out for him.

The writer is a retired admiral