Opinion When Korea invaded Korea

After two meetings of his cabinet,Nehru announced India’s acceptance of the second resolution,too. But he was deeply disturbed over the situation and determined to stick to his policy of non-alignment,to offer no military assistance to South Korea,and to do all he could to bring about a cease-fire on the Korean peninsula. Otherwise,he feared,there could be a wider war. Repeatedly and earnestly,he tried to prevent the conflict from spreading and to bring the warring sides nearer to each other,but repeatedly he was thwarted by an almost equal measure of obduracy on both sides. At one stage,he sent a personal message to Stalin and Dean Acheson,President Truman’s secretary of state. The Soviet leader “temporised” while replying; Acheson turned Nehru down flatly,bruising Indian sentiment. Yet,an interesting paradox was that whenever Nehru gave up both sides privately appealed to him to persevere in his efforts at mediation. The main reason for this was that China was completely isolated because of the consistent American rejection of Nehru’s plea for admitting China into the UN. The only channel of communication with Beijing was the Indian ambassador there,K. M. Panikkar,who regrettably did not cover himself with glory.

At a time when Nehru was hoping to persuade Russia and China to “localise” the Korean War,the US hectoring that the issues of Formosa (now called Taiwan) and Indo-China must be linked to the war,strained Nehru’s patience immensely. In a letter to Rajaji (C. Rajagopalachari) he wrote: “For all their great achievements,(the Americans) are apt to be more hysterical as a people than almost any others except perhaps the Bengalis”. On another occasion,he lamented that the world seemed to be in a mood to “commit suicide”. Some other difficulties,unrelated to Korea,rendered peacemaking even more difficult. The Tibet issue erupted in October 1950 and caused acrimony and bitterness between this country and China. More or less simultaneously,the Americans took grave umbrage at Nehru’s perfectly valid refusal to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty,as negotiated by John Foster Dulles who was soon to become Eisenhower’s powerful secretary of state.

After the US gained an upper hand in the war,it brushed aside Zhou Enlai’s warning,conveyed through the Indian ambassador,that China would intervene if the American troops crossed the 38th Parallel,which the Chinese did. India’s plea that carrying the war to the North should be avoided was treated in the same manner. Some time earlier,Truman was reported to have told a senator: “Nehru has sold us down the Hudson”. Ironically,Truman also had to sack the highly respected General MacArthur for his bellicosity and defiance of the president’s authority.

Eventually,the Korean War stalemated along the 38 Parallel but there was no movement towards peace even though some kind of armistice talks had begun at Panmunjon. For there was complete disagreement on the fate of large number of Communist prisoners who did not want to go back home. China insisted that all of them should be repatriated compulsorily. The US was adamant that repatriation should be voluntary. At the UN,Krishna Menon crafted a resolution suggesting that a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) should handle the nettlesome question. Reluctantly,the US accepted it. But the Soviet Union and China rejected it,Russia’s Andrei Vyshinsky condemning it in bitter terms.

Whether by coincidence or design,China and Russia indicated an interest in ending the Korean War soon after Stalin’s death. There was no way to resolve the repatriation imbroglio except the one India had suggested and they had rejected. A five-member NNRC,headed by India in the person of the outstanding General K. S. Thimayya,was appointed and given 120 days to ascertain the prisoners’ wishes. Even before the NNRC could start its work,Syngman Rhee queered the pitch by releasing the North Korean POWs in his custody. Other difficulties followed. At the end of the timeframe,the screening of prisoners was far from complete. However,22,064 Communist prisoners were eventually able to find refuge wherever they could. On the other hand,359 UN prisoners,of whom 22 were Americans,decided to stay on in China.

As late as 1976 a score of North Koreans were still languishing in Delhi in the hope of migrating to Europe or America. The then foreign secretary,Jagat Mehta,decided to offer them residence in India along with some financial help to start a new life. One of them who set up a poultry farm in Okhla is today a billionaire with worldwide business interests.

The writer is a Delhi-based commentator