Opinion What the attacks by Hamas mean for Israel — and Prime Minister Netanyahu

What are the realistic possibilities for Netanyahu and Israel?

One, in the immediate run, western countries, especially the US, are coming out from the cold and re-engaging actively with Netanyahu. Beginning with President Joe Biden, they promised unwavering support for Israel’s right to self-defence. Pentagon seems to back the American support with emergency military-security supplies and increased intelligence cooperation. This might happen despite two practical hurdles: The US House of Representatives lacks a Speaker, and the Senate is yet to confirm Jack Lew as ambassador to Israel. Biden had in fact waited until last month for a face-to-face meeting with Netanyahu.

Two, Israel will actively pursue the perpetrators of this massive infiltration. It is safe to assume that in the coming weeks and months, Israel will carry out overt and covert operations against the ringleaders of the Palestinian militant group. Israel mainly targeted militant leaders for a long, but since the Al-Aqsa intifada, it also went after political figures. Hence, it should not be surprising that all the senior members of Hamas — political and military — will be on Israel’s target list. Such operations will happen not only in the Gaza Strip but also elsewhere. Indeed, external leaders of Hamas, such as Khaled Mashal (against whom Israel carried out an unsuccessful attack in September 1997), suspected to be based in Doha since 2012, may not be safe after yesterday. This will be a long campaign and will not end anytime soon.

Three, the Hamas attacks are a 9/11 moment for Israel and require a more nuanced Israeli campaign. Irrespective of the inept handling of the Bush administration and its ill-fated military campaign against Afghanistan and Iraq, the Al Qaeda attacks delegitimised suicide bombing. Terrorism has lost its legitimacy among the wider international community. Rhetoric such as “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” is no longer acceptable, even in the Global South. Will Israel be able to turn the current Hamas attacks into the latter’s delegitimisation?

Besides killing a large civilian population, the militants have also kidnapped dozens of Israeli civilians, including women and children. Since they are non-combatants, they can’t be described, let alone treated, as prisoners of war. Available knowledge on the treatment of women by militant groups in the Middle East is anything but optimistic. Can “enemy” women expect better treatment than native Muslim women? Can Israeli women be safe under Hamas captivity? This will determine the international legitimacy of Hamas and its supporters.

Four, Israel has been focusing on Iran as the principal benefactor of Hamas. It can no longer ignore the role of Qatar. It is no accident that Doha has been engaging, funding and patronising several Islamist groups — including Hamas. This was one of the reasons for the four-year-old Arab boycott that was hastily ended in January 2021. Qatar has silenced its critics and detractors by effectively using its energy-generated wealth and sportswashing.
Indeed, the prolongation of the Israel-Hamas conflict in 2014 was partly fuelled by Doha. Now, Israel will have to drop its indifference vis-à-vis Doha’s role in strengthening Hamas. This means a greater role for Saudi Arabia on the Palestinian question. Israel must accommodate Saudi suggestions and proposals for shoring up support for Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Palestine National Authority that controls the West Bank.

Above all, the crisis offers a temporary reprieve to Netanyahu, who has been facing opposition over his reform agenda. Since January, Israelis have been demonstrating against his efforts to minimise the powers and functions of the judiciary. With Israel facing one of the worst crisis in its history, the population will now rally around Netanyahu. There are calls for a unity government. But these will be temporary. In recent weeks, there were fears that Netanyahu has been unable to pay sufficient attention to pressing security challenges in his determination to stay in office. The Hamas offensive vindicated that fear. Israeli citizens have been unforgiving of their leaders and governments if they fail in their fundamental security responsibility. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 eventually ended the monopoly of the Labor Party in Israeli politics. It is safe to assume that the Hamas surprise strike will do what peaceful protests by Israeli citizens could not achieve in 38 weeks: The end of Netanyahu’s political career.

The writer teaches contemporary Middle East in Jawaharlal Nehru University