Opinion They have a history…

This rivalry subsided in the 20th century,when Turkey became an inward-looking nation state. During the era of decolonisation,France lost political control of lands extending from Morocco in the west to Syria in the east. Paris,however,maintained economic and political clout in the region. Even Turkey once looked to France as a model: when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded modern Turkey in 1923,he championed the French model of hard secularism,which stipulates freedom from religion in government,politics and education.

While France has dominated much of the region over the past two centuries,that is now changing. And if Turkey plays its cards right,it could match France’s influence or even become the dominant power in the region.

In the last decade,Turkey has witnessed record-breaking economic growth. It has a $1.1 trillion economy,a powerful army and aspirations to shape the region in its image. As political turmoil paralyses North Africa,Syria and Iraq,and economic meltdown devastates much of Mediterranean Europe,Turkey and France have largely been spared. And their growing rivalry is one reason France has objected to Turkey’s bid for European Union membership. Taken together with France’s efforts to create a European-Mediterranean Union,a way to place France at the helm of the Mediterranean world,one thing has become obvious to the Turks: Paris won’t let it become a powerful player in a French-led Mediterranean region.

Turkey’s newly activist foreign policy has therefore shifted away from Europe. The ruling Justice and Development Party,known as the AKP,is now cultivating ties with former Ottoman lands that were ignored for much of the 20th century. Of the 33 new Turkish diplomatic missions opened in the past decade,18 are in Muslim and African countries.

This has resulted in new commercial and political ties,often at the expense of Turkey’s ties with Europe. In 1999,the European Union accounted for over 56 per cent of Turkish trade; in 2011,it was just 41 per cent. Over the same period,Islamic countries’ share of Turkish trade climbed to 20 per cent from 12 per cent.

Since 2002,Ataturk’s French-inspired model has collapsed; the AKP and its allies have instead promoted a softer form of secularism that allows for more religious expression in government,politics and education. This has made the Turkish model appealing to Arab countries,which for the most part regard French-style secularism as anathema.

Until it backed Libya’s rebels last year,France had bet on the enduring nature of dictatorships and never forged ties with the democratic forces opposing them; Turkey did so,perhaps unwittingly,by expanding its soft power into Arab countries. Now,the Arab Spring is providing Turkey with an unprecedented opportunity to spread its influence further.

Even so,the road ahead will be rocky. Arabs might be drawn to fellow Muslims,but like the French,the Turks are former imperial masters. Arabs are pressing for democracy,and if Turkey behaves like a new imperial power,this approach will backfire.

Turkey may have the upper hand in soft power,but France has more hard power,as the recent war in Libya and its veto power at the United Nations make clear. And despite Turkey’s phenomenal growth since 2002,the French economy is over twice the size of Turkey’s,and France is still dominant in North Africa.

If Turkey wants to become a true beacon of democracy in the Middle East,its new constitution must provide broader individual rights for the country’s citizens,including the Kurds. It will also need to fulfil Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s vision of a “no problems” foreign policy. This means moving past the 2010 flotilla episode to rebuild strong ties with Israel and getting along with the Greek Cypriots.

Turkey will rise as a regional power only if it sets a genuine example as a liberal democracy and builds strong ties with all its neighbours. This is Erdogan’s challenge as he tries to undo Napoleon’s legacy.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy