Opinion After 2014

The strategic partnership agreement initialled this week by Kabul and Washington marks a new phase in the political evolution of the northwestern subcontinent amidst the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan.

The agreement is meant to demonstrate the long-term US commitment to the security and stability of Afghanistan. Sceptics in the region and in Washington,however,will wonder how long the current American policy might survive amidst the uncertainties in Washington and Kabul. One proposition,though,appears definitive. Contrary to the popular assumption in the subcontinent,the US military role in Afghanistan is not coming to an end in 2014. What stops in 2014 is the direct participation of American troops in Kabul’s war against the Taliban and its associates with sanctuaries in Pakistan. The indications now are that the US will retain a significant military presence in Afghanistan after 2014 to help Kabul defend itself against its adversaries. The size of this American presence,the legal basis for it,and its full range of the military missions will be negotiated between Kabul and Washington after the partnership agreement is signed in the coming weeks.

On his part,US President Barack Obama is signalling that America will not abandon Afghanistan the way it did in the late 1980s when the Soviet occupation came to an end. Obama also wants to protect American interests in the region. These include preventing the al-Qaeda from regaining a home in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal and disrupting its current networks in Pakistan.

Thanks to the withdrawal of most American forces currently in Afghanistan (about 90,000),the new US commitment to Kabul will involve only a small fraction of the current expenditure,in blood and treasure. Therefore,in theory at least,the new American commitments should be politically sustainable in Washington,where the appetite for a prolonged war in Afghanistan has begun to evaporate.

Sovereign Ally

Sustained American and Western military support is critical for the survival of the present political structures in Kabul led by Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai. At the same time,Karzai is under domestic compulsion to demonstrate that his regime is not a puppet of the US. He negotiated hard to win the attributes of sovereignty in the agreement with the US. These include Kabul’s exercise of control over prisons,the unpopular night-time raids,the political arrangements on US military bases and the use of Afghan soil to attack others in the neighbourhood.

For Karzai,this was all about moving Afghanistan away from its current status as a “protectorate” of the US into a sovereign and equal partner with the West. The agreement reportedly declares Afghanistan,a “major non-NATO ally”. The US ambassador to Kabul,Ryan Crocker,who had served in hot spots as Iraq and Pakistan,said this is one of the most difficult negotiations he had ever conducted.

Once the stakeholders on both sides approve of the agreement,it will be signed by Obama and Karzai before the NATO summit in Chicago next month.

In Chicago,Obama is expected to mobilise solid international commitments to fund the Afghan national armed forces for a decade. The assessment is that an annual fund of nearly $4 billion might be necessary to sustain the Afghan national armed forces.

Historically,Kabul has never had the financial resources to support a large standing army. Kabul,however,is acutely aware that financial pledges made in international conferences are not always honoured.

View From Pindi

Besides the credibility of the Western promises,the big question is about Pakistan’s attitude towards a long-term US military presence in Afghanistan. Until now,the principal patron of the Afghan insurgency,the Pakistan army had bet that Kabul might be a pushover after the US forces stopped fighting in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. The Pakistan army’s recalibration of its Afghan strategy will depend on how robust the US strategy appears in Rawalpindi. A rapidly deteriorating economic condition and the unfinished threat from the Pakistani Taliban might,optimists hope,compel Rawalpindi to be more cooperative with the US. The pessimists will insist that Rawalpindi has invested far too much in the Afghan insurgency to be able to pull back and support a genuine reconciliation in Kabul.

The writer is a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation,Delhi