
The Mumbai terror strikes were waiting to happen. With some forward planning the police could have anticipated them and placed their forces on alert, rather than have waited for such a tragedy to take 200 lives in India8217;s commercial capital.
Why was the Mumbai tragedy almost preordained? First, there is the overall alienation of large sections in the Muslim community, both globally and locally, which has been exacerbated by the Gujarat riots. The rise of fundamentalism in the country during BJP rule, when organisations like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Bajrang Dal were given a free run, also added to the problem. The resultant antagonism in the Muslim population locally was exploited by two categories of players 8212; Muslim fundamentalists and political parties like the Samajwadi Party in UP and Maharashtra, attempting to garner Muslim votes. This, in turn, provided a free play to organisations such as the Students Islamic Movement of India SIMI and enabled it to expand its base in UP, Maharashtra, Kerala and other states.
Maharashtra has been particularly tolerant of these groups resulting in the mushrooming of madrassas and the growth of terror cells. Many secure bases for terror cells flourished in the city as well as in the state. Mumbai8217;s community-specific ghettoes provided a base for such cells to function with impunity under community cover. Any intrusion by the police into such areas is given a communal twist, which ends up preventing effective policing.
The crackdown on terror cells in Maharashtra in May was regarded as a triumph for the police, particularly the Anti-terror Task Force. It is now clear that these were just a few of the cells operating in the area. There were many awaiting an appropriate moment to strike. A crackdown on some cells does not mean the end of the terror network. It has to be followed through to ensure the complete elimination, or at least dismemberment, of the cells. The earlier triumph proved temporary and may have motivated other cells to do something spectacular 8212; resulting in the recent blasts.
The availability of weapons and explosives in and around Mumbai is a known fact. An AK-47 rifle can be procured at a price less than that for a motorcycle in the city. Also, large quantity of explosives 8212; meant for road building in Afghanistan 8212; have been known to be missing from ships off the Mumbai port. There has, apparently, been no follow up of such thefts and very little of this is known in the public domain.
The availability of such large quantities of explosives is not doubt a boon to the terror cells operating in the area. Lack of effective grassroots policing in the form of beat policing at the Mumbai railway stations 8212; particularly at Churchgate, CSVT, and elsewhere 8212; is another issue which needs serious consideration. Airport-like security at such densely packed public places may not be feasible, but prophylactic security by mobilising bomb squads, periodic surveillance and checks, can be a powerful deterrent. Such measures, apparently, are being ignored.
Crime and the coagulation of terror has been the highest in Mumbai, despite frequent crackdowns. Terrorism needs a critical mass of criminal activity to flourish, apart from the existence of a permissive police environment. Maharashtra 8212; Mumbai particularly 8212; provide just such an environment. Ironically, Maharashtra has a preventive law 8212; the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act MCCOCA, which has been used by the state to control the rise of terrorist activity in the past. But the law does not appear to have been successful in preventing terror strikes of the kind we saw on Tuesday, primarily because of the lack of effective implementation.
The resilience and resolve of the Mumbaikar arises from the failure of the political, bureaucratic and police systems in the city. The common citizen has been so deeply inured to administrative and political apathy that he/she instinctively turns to assist their fellow beings in times of crisis. The remedy for the city or the state is thus not far to seek. It lies in mobilising this public spirit for public safety. Civic education through a campaign similar to that launched by the Delhi Police may prove useful. Similarly, the police will have to adopt the famous Rudy Giuliani 8216;Broken Windows8217; policy towards crime. It helped to drastically reduce the crime rate in New York City during Giuliani8217;s tenure as mayor. It implies that every small report of crime has to be followed up diligently, just as a broken window in the house cannot be allowed to lie unattended.
The writer is a security analyst