
Let me start this piece with a statement that is certain to earn the ire of all military leaders of India. There are apparently no security experts in the Indian Armed Forces. Therefore, by extrapolation, there are no strategic leaders in the Indian military either. Military leaders may disagree with me, but the nation, as represented by the political leadership, the bureaucracy and other opinion-makers, seems to think so. Only one example should suffice.
We created a National Security Council NSC in 1999. A National Security Advisor NSA was appointed. We have had three incumbents so far 8212; two were retired diplomats and the third is a retired intelligence specialist. The NSA has a secretariat, which is headed by a deputy NSA. This appointment too has been held by retired diplomats so far. As far as the secretariat is concerned, officers of various ranks hold senior, middle level and junior staff appointments, but the military is represented only by a handful of junior officers.
The second part of the NSC, albeit outside the secretariat, is the National Security Advisory Board, a 20-person-strong entity where the military presence is a token of three 8212; one each from the army, navy and air force. The third component of the NSC is the Strategic Policy Group, an unwieldy group, meant to function as the link between the political decision-makers and the permanent secretariat. The Strategic Policy Group, headed by the cabinet secretary, comprises serving bureaucrats heading key ministries.
It would be obvious from the above details of the security structure that either the armed forces have no security experts who could be included in the NSC structure or there is a deliberate attempt to keep the military out of the decision-making loop. Whether this lacuna is the reason for the lacklustre performance of the NSC so far, is for readers to judge. National security has many facets 8212; political, military, economic, information technology and information warfare, demographic, communications, energy, science and technology and intelligence 8212; but when the chips are down, it is military capabilities which would determine whether national security is effectively maintained or not.
Even the biggest detractors of the armed forces will agree that the military is in the business of security at all levels 8212; tactical, operational and strategic. In addition, the military8217;s inputs at the national policy level are crucial to the formulation of grand strategy. In the six decades since Independence and even prior to that, the Indian Armed Forces have done a tremendous job in ensuring that the nation remains safe from external and internal threats. This includes their contribution to policy formulations at the highest levels. Therefore it is difficult to rationalise why the Armed Forces continue to be kept away from all national level security formulations.
It is nobody8217;s case that security is not the exclusive preserve of the military. But to exclude the military from decision-making relating to security aspects is not only absurd but indicates the tunnel vision of our governing elite. It would appear that even where the security of the nation is at stake, the political leadership continues to be more concerned with surrounding itself with yes-men and blue-eyed advisors, who would toe the line rather than consult experts whose recommendations may not conform to their own agendas.
The Indian Armed Forces, particularly the Army, are admired the world over for their professional expertise and their apolitical demeanour. On account of the sheer number and diverse nature of conflict situations handled by the Indian Army, it has built up considerable expertise. Yet when it comes to policy formulations, there is a deliberate effort to keep it out of the decision-making loop.
The toll of marginalising the military is increasingly visible to the discerning few. There is an obvious need to initiate two inter-related measures. One, the NSC needs to be reorganised and reoriented, so that it shifts its focus to the formulation of long and medium term strategies. Two, and perhaps more importantly, the military must be co-opted in the decision making process. It will not only bring its considerable professional talents to the current generic stances but will also bring with it its well-entrenched methodology of doing business 8212; comprehensively, in a timely manner and with a high degree of focus on issues that matter.
The writer is a former vice chief of army staff and is currently director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies