Listening in

The US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan,Richard Holbrookes statement in New Delhi that the US is making no demands on India,and his public disavowal of any pressure on Kashmir,may well be true in a technical sense. A serious discussion on what Indias next step can be is likely to begin only when Holbrooke succeeds in getting Islamabad to accept the Obama administrations terms for fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. At the moment it is unclear if Pakistans military and civilian leaders have the stomach for that arduous fight. Nor is it a secret that there is growing tension between Holbrooke and his Pakistani interlocutors on how to stabilise Afghanistan. The US is demanding Pakistans adherence to specific benchmarks in return for a massive increase in its military and economic aid. Pakistan wants American money with no strings attached. Islamabad hopes to continue with the pretence of a fight against terrorism.

India should be fully prepared for some big initial mistakes by the Obama administration and characteristic over-reach by Pakistans generals. Notwithstanding Holbrookes flattering remarks that India is central to the resolution of the conflict in the region between the Indus and the Hindu Kush,New Delhi should not forget the significant limitations on its potential role in shaping the internal dynamics of Afghanistan and Pakistan. India must however ensure that the Pakistan army is compelled to fight a war on its western borders that it does not want to. That in turn implies that India should not be used as an excuse to the Pakistan army to shift the international focus on to its eastern frontiers.

That US and India are now talking about Pakistan,for the first time since Partition,is welcome. New Delhi did have some reason to be apprehensive about reverse pressure from the US on Islamabad. Yet,unlike in the early 1960s or the early 1990s,India today is much stronger and far less vulnerable to external pressures on Kashmir. As it stays engaged with Holbrooke,New Delhi has no incentive whatsoever to reduce the all-important Af-Pak policy debate to a bilateral problem with either Washington or Islamabad.