Waiting for Nawaz

With the SC having unshackled itself, that has started to change. The court8217;s newfound enthusiasm for judicial activism may have its own pitfalls but that is a separate debate. For now, suffice it to say that no one, not even the government, expected the court to pass any judgment other than what has been delivered.

Is the decision legal or political?

The court has determined, setting aside any debate on the 8216;agreement8217; under which the Sharif family had left Pakistan, that no one can contract out of his fundamental rights under the Constitution. A citizen cannot even do that of his own volition. Period. Therefore, in light of Article 15, which deals with freedom of movement, the Sharifs are free to return to Pakistan.

Sound enough, legally. But the timing is political, which busts the Dworkinian myth that legalism must be shorn of any reference external to the law. This is where law and politics meet, and this is why people expected the SC to give relief to the Sharifs. In passing the judgment that the honourable bench did, the judges have tried to find the equation that binds law and politics in a legal-normative framework in and through which politics must be played.

The agreement that sent the Sharifs packing was itself politics using law, putty-like, to hide its coarse surface. The SC has scratched it. Law has won but only when the political situation began to unfold in its favour.

The government has determined that if the 8216;agreement8217; had no legal value, then it is status quo ante in relation to the Sharifs. No agreement means the cases against the brothers remain intact, as do their convictions. Here we see again the use of law to serve political ends. It remains to be seen how the courts would react to the Sharifs8217; appeals against the pending cases and convictions 8212; though, and this is interesting again, the majority of Pakistanis think they the Sharifs will be exonerated.

Clearly, in the political tussle between the Musharraf government and the rest, people have come to expect the SC and the law to be on their side. Nothing less will do or, if popular sentiment is expressed plainly, be tolerated.

Whether the honourable court will allow itself to be dictated by the people or by the impersonal letter of the law is one of the imponderables right now. The trend is worrying but shows that when politics seeks to put the law down, the legal-normative framework is demolished and structural anomalies created. In Pakistan8217;s version of The People Vs Larry Flynt, Musharraf is likely to lose.

On the other side of politics, the news should worry Benazir Bhutto8217;s Pakistan People8217;s Party. Bhutto had assessed that more than the civil-military divide, the extremist-liberal contradiction was going to determine the future of Pakistan. That meant 8216;dealing8217; with Musharraf and finding some mechanism for a smooth transition to the next phase.

The decision went against public opinion but Bhutto probably thought the PPP could pull it off by virtue of being the largest political party with the biggest vote bank. Initial covert contacts led to more overt actions. Bhutto refused to participate in the multi-party conference convened by Sharif in London and also opposed the formation of an electoral alliance, which included the religious Mutahidda Majlis-e Amal.

Sharif was deeply unhappy. While Bhutto had found a fallback position, Sharif had none. Later, with the Abu Dhabi meeting between Musharraf and Bhutto, the contours of the 8216;deal8217; became public. At that point, Sharif gave a burial to the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy and announced that he would not deal with Musharraf.

As matters stand, Bhutto has burnt her boats. She cannot go back to the opposition; and she cannot enter the tent if Musharraf doesn8217;t let her in though the SC verdict may now force a dithering Musharraf to stitch a deal post haste.

If Bhutto is cut loose by both sides, she will have no option but to contest elections purely on the strength of her own party, and against the combined opposition on one hand and the ruling faction of the Muslim League and its cohorts on the other. That, given the popular mood, may not redound to the PPP8217;s advantage. Conversely, if Musharraf does embrace her, the politics of Pakistan will again see the deep cleavage between the pro- and anti-Musharraf entities after a spate of political alignments and re-alignments.

Popular sentiment may be misplaced but is crucial to any electoral exercise. People do not like Musharraf because he is seen as an autocrat; they also detest him because he symbolises Pakistan8217;s impotence in the face of an increasingly recidivist United States. On both issues, the Right and the Left are cheek by jowl.

Popularity ratings have already put Sharif and his League on top. If he does return, as he would if he is an astute politician, the losers are likely to be Bhutto and Musharraf. The ruling League does not matter because most of them will have joined up with Sharif anyway.

Bhutto and Musharraf may then go down 8220;As two spent swimmers that do cling together/ And choke their art8230;8221;

The wild card is Musharraf declaring Emergency or even martial law. If that happens, the jig will be up.

The writer is op-ed editor 8216;Daily Times8217; and consulting editor 8216;The Friday Times8217;. Views are his own