Total security? No such thing

In New York8217;s subway system we are constantly reminded by the recorded voice on the public address system to report any suspicious, unattended package. I8217;d be quite happy to do that, if only I could be sure that the package next to the passenger seated across from me wasn8217;t really his, or his neighbour8217;s, or that of the man jammed in front hanging on to the rod over the seats, even when one of them leaves and the package is still there. There8217;s no room even to cross over to ask. And I suspect the New York subway car has half the human density of a Mumbai suburban train compartment.

Then the terrorists would need one trained person to assemble the bombs with their simple timers. 8220;Training8221; is probably not the right word: it wouldn8217;t take much for an ordinary mechanic or electrician to learn how to do it. I8217;m told that it8217;s not at all difficult to smuggle in 10 kg of RDX. You don8217;t even need to assume ISI complicity.

On the other side, even the best trained and most amply-funded security force could never have provided a shield for the Mumbai commuter. It is simply impossible to imagine a security cordon in or around Mumbai train stations or platforms, or a passenger screening system that would detect explosives in a tiffin carrier and still make it possible for commuters to commute. Surely no one would suggest banning all briefcases and other packages. Nor is it likely that the security forces could penetrate every group of terrorists, especially when those groups have become autonomous, not needing or wanting direction from someone in Al Qaeda, or any other group. There is no direct defence against an outrage of this kind, none.

Nazar na lag jaye, but the 8216;success8217; can be seen in the targets not hit: prominent citizens of the country, headquarter buildings of 8216;enemy8217; organisations, government offices. There have been unsuccessful attempts and nipped-in-the-bud efforts complete with confiscated RDX and weaponry. With so many targets, surely we can give credit to the security forces for preventing more, and even worse, incidents?

Everyone is filled with admiration for the way Mumbaikars dealt with this tragedy, on the day itself and in the aftermath. As in the last major attack of this kind, on the BSE and other targets, there were no riots touched off and no lynching, if that was the terrorists8217; goal. I am reminded of how we New Yorkers reacted in the days after 9/11: mourn the dead by keeping them in mind, but outwardly return as fast as possible to getting to work, doing one8217;s daily chores, understanding that the stranger is not an enemy. There were some dishonourable exceptions then, of innocent people being attacked, but only a very few. Pretty soon one paid no attention even to low-flying aircraft. That outcome must be the most frustrating of all to the terrorists: you hit hard and viciously and the blow is absorbed, with social bonds between people of different faiths and origins, if anything, strengthened.

Yet the analysts declaim that now something must be done to punish the unknown terrorists and their presumed paymasters; that the system must be overhauled so that nothing like this will ever happen again. But it will happen, and making 8216;war8217; on terrorists when we can8217;t really identify them as individuals is, as many have argued, entirely counter-productive. The sorry saga of the terrible mistakes the US government has made in attacking Iraq and handling the international dimension of the problem need not be retold here. The over-reaction and subsequent undermining of the rights of citizens and others in the US that has occurred as part of hastily implemented domestic policies and programmes that don8217;t even work 8212; no serious terrorist plot has been uncovered, nor terrorists apprehended on US soil, since 9/11 8212;indicates a more important lesson.

In the words Benjamin Franklin published but probably did not say, 8220;Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.8221; We saw off the limb on which we sit when we attempt to monitor phone calls without very specific reason to believe that the persons involved are actively plotting something; when we lock people up because their names pop up often mistakenly on some watch list but then not allow them to even know what charge they face, let alone what evidence there is that they might refute; when we install cameras and a small army of police to monitor crowds in the hopes of spotting a few faces among millions; and, worst of all, when we suppress free speech in public places, including on the internet, on the grounds that the government should 8220;stop the spread of terrorism8221;. By the time we have the illusion of being completely secure, there will be not much liberty left.

Being completely secure is an unreachable goal, as these and other tragedies have shown. Strengthening security must be focused on those areas where there is a demonstrable chance of success, and that success must be recognised, even when there is a certainty that there will be another time when many will die in terrorist attacks, as in natural disasters.

The writer is a research scholar at the Southern Asian Institute, Columbia University