Premium
This is an archive article published on November 21, 1997

Time for realpolitik

Madeleine Albright came for a day, met I.K. Gujral, touched base with leaders of potential power structures, and went home. While she spent...

.

Madeleine Albright came for a day, met I.K. Gujral, touched base with leaders of potential power structures, and went home. While she spent nearly a week in the Gulf, she spent two and a half days in Pakistan and India. The time spent on substantive discussions would not have exceeded ten to twelve hours. The visit manifests the priority of South Asia in US foreign policy.

Since Clinton8217;s commitment to a stronger US presence in South Asia in August last, there has been a marginally increased focus on Asia. But compared to US interests in Central Asia, West Asia and its prioritisation of China, Japan and Russia, India has low importance. Then why did Albright come to Delhi at all? To signal high-level US foreign policy attention to India and to prepare the ground for Clinton8217;s likely visit. She also wanted to assess India8217;s US policy and the evolving political situation here and see whether a Presidential visit would be worthwhile, given the current uncertainties.

The possibility of US help on Kashmir and Indo-Pak relations could also be examined. An assessment of US prospects in the Indian economy would also be evaluated, besides the extent to which India and the US can engage on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues, despite their basic differences. Albright8217;s final objective might have been a tour de horizon8217; with Gujral about the South Asian situation and the prospects of Indo-US cooperation in nurturing stability and encouraging economic modernisation.

She would have been interested in India8217;s relations with Russia, China and the ASEAN countries, the objective being to structure an equation with India in the context of US interests and evolving Indian orientations towards them.The media has provided extensive instant analysis of Albright8217;s visit. It is broader long-term factors which merit speculation. With the end of the Cold War, India is more interested in expanding relations with the US. The US, presumably, would not be burdened with Cold War anxieties about India8217;s involvement with former socialist countries. While it has substantive economic relations with China and ASEAN, India is also an attractive market.

Given expanding US interests in Central Asia and its abiding interest in the Gulf, America8217;s unidimensional strategic concentration on Pakistan may undergo a change, with India figuring as an influencing factor. Though there is a detente between the US and Russia and the US and China, these, with their technological and nuclear capacities, can be potential rivals in US perceptions. Nurturing a politically stable and economically and technologically strong India would create a balancing factor in Asia.

For the next 50 years at least, the US is likely to be the leading power with a combination of economic strength, political stability, military power and technological capacities. China is likely to emerge as its nearest approximate in economic and military influence, though it may not have America8217;s global reach and technological capacities in the foreseeable future. But America8217;s vital strategic and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region will be at variance with China8217;s ambitions.

India8217;s long-term security concerns in relation to China and Pakistan generally coincide with America8217;s desire for stability and peace not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but also in the Indian Ocean, the Gulf and Central Asia region. India8217;s economic aspiration would depend much on cooperation with the US, Europe and Japan. The US can remain the principal source of both investment and technology for India in the long term. Sustained cooperation with the US will have the ripple effect of India expanding its relations with the other important power centres: the EU, Russia, Japan and China. This in turn would enable India to deal with the US from a position of relative equality. It is in this context that India and the US must address some very basic differences on non-proliferation, disarmament and security. An all-or-nothing stance will be detrimental to both Indian and US interests. America8217;s concerns are not India-specific; they have global strategic dimensions. India8217;s concerns in this regard are primarily rooted in our security concerns and our perceptions about our strategic and security environment. The approach of both countries should be to undertake a constructive engagement through the instrumentalities of technical and issue-specific discussions and dialogue. Gujral8217;s reported suggestion to Clinton that we should resume such a dialogue is practical. We must firmly tell the US that India cannot compromise on its security options, but at the same time the US should be assured that our foreign and defence policies will not militate against its interests, so long as the US reciprocates our approach. Similarly, the touch-me-not complex which we have about the USA discussing Indo-Pak relations with us only manifests our lack of confidence.

Story continues below this ad

We should not shy away from discussion and our approach should be to influence the USA to persuade Pakistan to adopt a practical approach. We must also underline that we have no desire for a military conflict with Pakistan, far from a nuclear conflict. The US can make vital contributions to the energy, transport, power and technological sectors if our economic policies, while focussing on India8217;s fundamental interests, are also responsive to long-term US interests. Indo-US cooperation can be a trigger for mutually complementary cooperation involving India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, particularly in the energy and power sectors. Both Indian and US companies as well as their counterparts in Bangladesh and Pakistan are deeply interested in such possibilities. There are indications that the US is focussing on India in a framework broader than the traditional US terms of reference for balancing Indo-Pak relations. There is an increasing awareness about the potentialities of Indo-US relations. India8217;s US policy should be responsive to these emerging trends.

India8217;s attempt to promote regional cooperation around the pivot of Indian economic potentialities can be achieved if underpinned by long-term relations with the US. India8217;s objective of economic modernisation and stability and structuring stable regional cooperation requires a change of approach towards the US. Both realpolitik and long-term Indian interests argue in favour of a meaningful and practical equation.

 

Latest Comment
Post Comment
Read Comments
Advertisement
Loading Taboola...
Advertisement
Advertisement
Advertisement