
During a recent visit to India, many retired military officers of Pakistan, known 8220;hawks8221; when in uniform, said retirement had transformed them and they now realised human values and aspirations were more important. Friendship with India and peace were critical for Pakistan, which had many interests in common with India. On our side also, we have several hawks turned peacenicks who espouse the same view. The common thread running through the interaction was that all would be well if just one problem, of Kashmir, also referred to as the 8220;core issue8221;, was resolved.
People have every right to their opinions, even if these come as afterthoughts, post retirement. But to claim, as Pakistan does, that Kashmir is a core issue does not make any sense. Of the four Indo-Pak conflicts, two had little to do with Kashmir. The 8217;71 war, by far the most confrontational, was about East Pakistan, not Kashmir. Kargil, in 1999, was more about trying to redraw the LoC in the Ladakh area and to put Indian supply lines under some strain, but it was not about the Valley, always trumpeted as the core issue. In 1948 and 1965, Pakistan itself claims only 8220;irregulars8221;, not its army, had gone into the Valley, expecting the local population to rise in rebellion against India, but this did not happen. If the Valley was such a core issue, why has Pakistan never attempted to use the military option, it may be asked. Its claims that it stands for the legitimate political and human rights of the people of the region also does not pass muster. It showed no such concern when the same rights of the people in neighbouring Afghanistan were trampled upon during the Taliban regime.
Yes, starting in the 1980s, there has been local dissatisfaction, bordering on militancy, in the Valley, largely due to our own mistakes; this has been exploited by Pakistan to escalate it through cross border aid of men and material. Whenever the magnitude of this 8220;external8221; aid has decreased, for example in the winter months, or now, through construction of a boundary fence, terrorism has diminished, which is a pointer to its origin.
It is clever of Pakistan to refer to it as a 8220;core issue8221;. In fact, Kashmir, for Pakistan, has for the last 20 years been the foundation on which its military has built and nurtured its elitism, as the saviour of the nation. Its reputation was in shreds after the 1971 defeat and it has exploited the situation in the Valley to claim relevance. Without this lifeline, it would slump to a more ordinary status enjoyed by any other military in any other part of the world. Therefore, those who see in the ongoing dialogue process a resolution of India-Pakistan differences are naive and dangerous 8212; the latter as they try and create a sense of complacency which is not warranted.
But just as the military in Pakistan has a vested interest in keeping Kashmir 8220;alive8221;, our own land forces too are well served by the continuing scenario. For 50 years, the army has been seen as the only real military power in India. The times are changing. With nuclear equivalence and a transformed international security environment seriously constraining military options for nation states like India and China, questions are going to be asked about the type of military power India needs and the relevance of a land force numbering 1.2 million people, equipped, by and large, with technology 10 to 15 years old. There is only one straw to clutch at this difficult time: the threat from Pakistan. Without this life jacket, the army must, inevitably, diminish in strength and stature.
In the emerging global security environment, conventional military conflicts between nation states are giving way to other concerns, threats from non-state actors, threats to energy and trade lifelines from small groups of moderate capability but high, though misplaced, motivation, hurdles to economic growth, threats to internal coherence and social amity, and so many others. These have expanded the spectrum of India8217;s concerns dramatically and it will continue to broaden as the country grows economically and seeks a larger role in international affairs. Military power, along with other elements of state power, has to be restructured to deal with this new world in order that our interests may be safeguarded.
This can only be possible if, as taught in military staff colleges, we 8220;re-appreciate the situation8221;. This will show that the two countries must stabilise their nuclear interfaces and their interactions on the LoC. They can either do this and prepare to meet the new challenges, or they can continue to pursue their purposeless and outdated spats, oblivious of what is happening around them, to their own disadvantage. The first step is to recognise the Kashmir issue for what it should really be, a non-issue. This alone, can open the road to peace and tranquility, which our retired colleagues from Pakistan so fervently seek.
The writer is a former vice-admiral and was a member of a government taskforce to review higher defence management in India