
Can a party with 10 MPs and 1.38 per cent of the national vote hold up a reform that will positively affect millions of employees, future social security policy, the national and state exchequers and capital markets? It can. The CPI8217;s inflexibility, as reported and analysed in detail in this newspaper on Wednesday, is delaying a workable compromise on the already horribly delayed pension reform. The CPM is reportedly not too thrilled at Left junior8217;s recalcitrance. Indeed, it is in the CPM8217;s larger interest to tell the CPI to either grow up or give up. Left-government negotiations are complicated enough without the CPI8217;s insistence on taking the 8220;ideological high ground8221;. Plus, and equally important, the CPM8217;s own political and policy agenda is getting more grounded and complex. This is encouraging but it cannot really accommodate a partner who has little stake in governance realities.
The CPM doesn8217;t really need the CPI to run any of its state governments. The CPI8217;s 10 MPs cannot exercise a veto on the Left8217;s parliamentary strength either. But precisely because its numbers are so small, the CPI on many occasions feels free of any obligation to be pragmatic. That, and not the fact that senior CPI leaders have trade union backgrounds, explains the party8217;s essential motivation on not only pension reform but on a number of other issues. Political free riders are a familiar problem in any multi-party arrangement. The solution is familiar, too. The costs of free riding must increase. That means, in this case, the CPM must remind the CPI that the latter may face an existential crisis of the electoral variety minus the former8217;s fraternal help.
The Congress can aid this process. It can tell the CPM that it is difficult for the ruling party to face two sets of Left demands and that it considers the CPM the more responsible interlocutor. Then, it can work out a pension formula with the CPM. And then, it will be interesting to see what options the CPI reckons it has.