Reforms in MoD

Bravo! It has at last dawned on New Delhi that it is essential for the three armed forces to contribute to decision-making in the Defence...

Bravo! It has at last dawned on New Delhi that it is essential for the three armed forces to contribute to decision-making in the Defence Ministry, hitherto the exclusive privilege of politicians and civilians. One of the major curiosities of Indian democracy 8212; some would say a serious weakness 8212; has been that defence planning required so little help from the military.

There will now be a remedy. George Fernandes promises a totally new structure integrating the MoD and defence services. This is the good news. The not-so-good-news is that he believes a whole new and improved MoD can hit the ground running by the month-end. Such alacrity would be commendable were it not for the fact that the MoD has on its hands, by Fernandes8217; own admission, three different sets of proposals for integration from the service chiefs, plus other recommendations; and there is the highly praised Arun Singh committee report which has been gathering dust for a decade.

One does not, naturally, underrate the present MoD8217;s capacityto pluck out what it thinks best from these documents and concoct a scheme of some sort. But will it be coherent and workable? After what has gone on in recent weeks, it would be reassuring to be told it is not going to be a patchwork job or a bit of window-dressing as in the case of the National Security Guards but that a final decision on the shape of the new edifice will be preceded by consultations with military and other experts and careful thought.

Integration should be designed to bring about efficiency and rationality in three major areas: long-term defence planning, defence procurement, and promotions and transfers of officers. There are many instances in the annals of defence planning which reveal the yawning gap between what policy-makers think warfighting is about and what the military knows it to be.

Two recent examples will suffice. One of the weapons in India8217;s secret chemical weapons arsenal now being destroyed turned out to be a poison gas mortar which the military was never told aboutand never would have considered using on the battlefield. India8217;s nuclear weapons policy remains the preserve of politicians, scientists and technocrats; the armed forces have been left the task of reworking their plans and lists of new equipment in the light of that policy.

At the minimum, therefore, the new MoD set-up should create conditions for civilian officers and the political leadership to benefit from military expertise and all pull in the same direction.

Current controversies over defence procurement allegations about the influence of arms dealers and the public row over the T-90 tank would suggest that the main problem is one of transparency and devising better checks and balances. These matters certainly need close attention. Equally important is the issue of integrating defence research with defence procurement and both with long-term defence plans.

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Ad hocism and sacred cowism must end; what may be politically feasible at one point in time is not necessarily desirable from a longer termmilitary point of view. As for promotions and transfers, rules and procedures will work well only so long they are observed scrupulously and politicians in particular stop imagining they are blessed with twice-born wisdom.