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This is an archive article published on December 8, 2003

Pak146;s new India policy?

India8217;s prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, has formally confirmed to Islamabad that he will attend the 12th summit of the South Asia...

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India8217;s prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, has formally confirmed to Islamabad that he will attend the 12th summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation scheduled to be held in Islamabad January 4-6. This is a good beginning. Islamabad can credit itself for taking all the steps required to create the atmosphere conducive for Mr Vajpayee8217;s visit.

However, while it is clear that Pakistan has invested much in trying to make the upcoming SAARC meeting 8216;8216;successful,8217;8217; the question of where to go from the point of starting talks about talks remains moot. Unlike Pakistan, India8217;s diplomacy has been evolving with a degree of consistency which is owed both to its greater ability to set its foreign policy landmarks correctly as well as the decreasing ability of Pakistan to pursue its own traditional India policy in the face of changing geopolitical realities within and outside the region. This essentially means that Pakistan, if it wants to normalise, will have to lower its expectations and take some more unilateral steps in order to change the course of its India policy. While the more hawkish opinion in Pakistan may not like this fact, it is not necessarily a bad thing to happen. Why is that?

Any policy, but especially adversarial policy, must have an endgame, or a termination point. Kashmir is no exception. The issue can be looked at in two ways: either one focuses on the solution of the problem or one decides to shift the emphasis to a solution of the problem. The former implies a continuing capability to carry on with conflictual stalemate; the latter denotes a desire, whether for positive or negative reasons, to move towards a resolution. But the essential point to note is that resolution, in the case of the side that wants to get off the conflict ladder, may not be what it originally wanted or claimed. But neither does it need be an armistice between the victor and the vanquished. India cannot defeat Pakistan despite being much bigger which is different from being able to hold onto something that Pakistan wants. Between these two poles lies the opportunity to work out a solution agreeable to all sides even as all sides have to climb down from their maximalist positions.

There is some indication that this is indeed the way that Pakistan is looking at the problem now. Islamabad8217;s initial response to India8217;s offer of a bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad was legalistic. It was correct within the previous policy framework. However, Pakistan has since nuanced it. It is not averse to a bus service in principle between the two points in Kashmir. It does not want a third-party to monitor the service and would be content with the rider that such a service would not mean Pakistan8217;s acceptance of India8217;s suzerainty over the disputed territory. This rider takes care of the legal-technical side; but more importantly, it reflects a major leap in political terms and opens space for making other probes in areas where cooperation can be extended.

It is difficult to wager one8217;s money on the prospects of India-Pakistan 8216;8216;peace8217;8217; given the history of disappointments and the spoiler element, but this much can be said with some confidence: if the pace of unilateral concessions is kept up, it is likely to translate into some bilateral trust. And trust is what India and Pakistan have always lacked. But we would be remiss not to mention one aspect of the present moves even as we welcome them. Pakistan needs to understand the importance of evolving policies rather than suddenly waking up to events outside and then effecting an about-face. We saw this happen with our Afghanistan policy two years ago and we may now be witnessing it regarding India. These course changes are likely to be good in the longer run but they point to structural flaws within the system which seems incapable of taking the correct course on its own until the costs have run very high externally.

Therefore, there is need to improve the mechanism by developing expertise within and outside the government on such issues. Such a mechanism must also work on the basis of constant interface between people within the government and outside in order to debate the foreign and national security policies without the 8216;negative8217; and 8216;positive8217; perceptions being attached to the categories of 8216;doves8217; and 8216;hawks8217; respectively. While policies can never be seamless, neither should they come in fits and starts. Events in and around Pakistan since September 11, 2001 have shown clearly the importance of creating a cadre of experts in a competitive environment of professional think tanks and universities that can be employed to study such issues and give policy input. We do hope that this finds place within the conceptual paradigm General Pervez Musharraf has for a modern, progressive Pakistan.

This editorial appeared in Daily Times, December 6.

 

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