Onward, with eyes open

In his Parliament address on Thursday, Prime Minister Vajpayee came up with what was, arguably, his most comprehensive statement on the pres...

In his Parliament address on Thursday, Prime Minister Vajpayee came up with what was, arguably, his most comprehensive statement on the present state of India-Pakistan relations to date. Its text was as significant as its timing. Vajayee was speaking not just to the people of India by addressing Parliament, he was speaking to the world community given that US Deputy Secretary of StateRichard Armitage was visiting the region. What came through, of course, was his long-term commitment to the peace process—but with eyes wide open. Fear of failure was not about to derail this initiative. From someone who had witnessed two initiatives of this kind go awry, this represents a rare optimism which should go some way in shoring up the peace process in the days to follow.

There were two issues on which Prime Minister Vajpayee unambiguously spoke his mind: General Pervez Musharraf’s proposals of a ‘‘no-war pact’’ and the ‘‘de-nuclearisation of South Asia’’. A no-war pact was also offered by General Zia ul-Haq soon after his martial law regime was recognised by Washington and Pakistan was accepted as the ‘‘front-line state’’ to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan; and, earlier, General Mohamed Ayub had come up with a defence pact when Pakistan moved closer to Washington in the fifties.

So, in a sense, this was history repeating itself. General Musharraf has obviously not read the Simla Agreement. Under the terms of this agreement, both countries had committed themselves not to use force, or even to use the threat of force, against each other, particularly across the LoC. So the question arises, how does Islamabad propose to define war? As Prime Minister Vajpayee put it, shouldn’t there be a no proxy war pact?

General Musharraf’s second point, about mutually agreed de-nuclearisation, is also an old formulation which is based on the assumption that India would never agree to be non-nuclear as long as nuclear weapons impinge on its security, regardless of the source of that nuclear threat. If the problem were merely one of India-Pakistan, as many people in the West tend to believe, then the obvious policy choice for a conventionally superior India would have been to seek de-nuclearisation of South Asia.

General Musharraf knows more than any one else that Pakistan sought its nuclear weapons because of the conventional superiority of India, which in the eyes of its policy makers ‘‘hangs like the Sword of Damocles’’ over it for all time.

But, as the prime minister pointed out, New Delhi saw its atomic capability as being prompted by the evolving security scenario in Asia. Vajpayee’s clarifications and plainspeaking on these issues are useful correctives. It makes eminent sense to draw the lines of engagement before the engagement begins.