Officials secrets facts

Why did Lt. General Safdar Hussain, Commander of the Pakistani forces in the Northwest Frontier Province react so strongly to comments by Am...

Why did Lt. General Safdar Hussain, Commander of the Pakistani forces in the Northwest Frontier Province react so strongly to comments by American Lieutenant General David Barno that Pakistan was about to launch an anti-terrorist operation along its border with Afghanistan? According to media reports, Safdar described his American counterpart8217;s comments as 8216;8216;highly irresponsible.8217;8217;

Since the day Pakistan chose to become an American ally in the war against Al-Qaeda, it has been assumed that the two sides share intelligence and quite often plan operations together. But Pakistani generals are highly sensitive about what appears in the press. The spat between General Barno and General Safdar tells us something about the relationship of generals. General Barno commands the troops of a democracy, where officials are answerable to the people. He deems it necessary to speak to journalists and while he probably spins every now and then, he is expected to reveal at least part of truth most of the time.

General Safdar, on the other hands, has reached the second highest rank in an army that is used to holding civilians accountable but which considers itself answerable to no one. He talks to the press only to tell them what he thinks and if he does not want something to be revealed he can warn reporters that they should not report it 8216;8216;in the national interest.8217;8217; Pakistan8217;s history is replete with instances where the Pakistanis learnt about what was happening in their own country through the foreign media. The surrender of Pakistani forces in erstwhile East Pakistan is one example. The facts of what happened in Kargil are another.

General Tommy Franks, the Commander of US Central Command during the Afghan war of 2001, published his memoirs not long. In that book titled American Soldier General Franks writes of his efforts to forge strategic ties with General Musharraf. 8216;8216;Musharraf8217;s a soldier,8217;8217; General Franks says he told CIA Director George Tenet in 2000. 8216;8216;So are most of the key players in his government. You have to see their world from the military perspective.8217;8217; The US general offered help to Pakistan 8216;8216;to modernize her conventional forces, thus reducing her reliance on nuclear arms8217;8217; even before 9/11 led to Pakistan8217;s renewed alliance with the US. In a January 2001 meeting with Franks, General Musharraf summarized complex information for him like the general that he had been 8216;8216;before leading an Army coup in 1999.8217;8217; It is unlikely that Musharraf summarized unsavory details of civil-military relations or that Franks remembered the chronology of internal and external developments in Pakistan8217;s history. According to Franks, 8216;8216;Musharraf added that the only reason Pakistan had invested so much wealth and energy into developing ballistic missiles was that their air force had been crippled by America8217;s arms embargo.8217;8217; In fact, Pakistan had gone public with its missile programme in 1989, which it described then as being in an advanced stage, long before US sanctions interrupted the delivery of F-16 fighter jets in 1990. For Franks, dealing with Musharraf was a soldier-to- soldier matter. 8216;8216;His military needed help; so did we. Maybe we could make deal,8217;8217; Franks believed. 8216;8216;It struck me that it was appropriate we both wore uniforms. For years, US officials and diplomatic envoys in business had hectored soldier-politicians such as Musharraf about human rights and representative government. Of course, I believed in these with equal conviction, but at this point in history we needed to establish priorities. Stopping Al-Qaeda was such a priority and Musharraf was willing to help.8217;8217;

US generals and their Pakistani counterparts often make military to military deals. It is just that the Pakistani generals like to keep their end of the bargain secret whereas the Americans have no such compunction. About the developments after 9/11, General Franks writes that he told his government, 8216;8216;President Musharraf likes and respects but he8217;s got a heavy duty Islamic extremist population to deal with. And I can8217;t see conducting operations inside Afghanistan without basing, staging, and overflight support from the Paks.8217;8217; According to General Franks8217;s account, Musharraf was eager to cooperate even before the diplomats of both countries agreed on reviving relations. Franks reveals that Musharraf first mentioned to him the possibility of Osama being in Tora Bora and said that his intelligence officers would know if he crossed into Pakistan. But the most important revelation in Franks8217;s memoirs relates to a purported agreement about hot pursuit. 8216;8216;And he confirmed our earlier agreement about incursions by Coalition forces over the ill-defined border into Pakistan when 8216;in hot pursuit8217; of Taliban and al-Qaeda. 8216;8216;Your troops are very discreet8217;8217;, he commented, 8216;8216;I know they will be discreet.8217;8217;

General Safdar Hussain8217;s anger with General Barno seems to be about not maintaining that discretion. But as an ordinary Pakistani, I am grateful to Generals Franks and Barno for occasionally informing us hapless 150 million citizens what is transpiring in, or along the borders of, our beloved country. If our rulers insist on keeping secrets from us, let our rulers8217; allies tell us the truth.

The writer is a Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace