Midnight reversal

Much depends on how the coup leaders in Thailand manage the transition to a new government

The military coup in Thailand that ousted Thaksin Shinawatra was the result of a number of immediate and long-term reasons. The immediate reason could well be that this was an opportunistic move by the Thai army to oust the prime minister when he was out of the country. But tensions were building up over a number issues: allegations of corruption by the regime, the deteriorating situation in southern Thailand, including recent bombings in Hat Tai, and the continuing political stalemate which were hurting the economy. There were ample indications that Thaksin had lost the support of the king and large sections of the army, although he did and still does have a few supporters in the military, especially among his classmates.

The coup is thus the result of a combination of forces, army factions that were getting impatient with the political stalemate and sensing the growing alienation between the king and Thaksin, Privy Council members who had also lost confidence in Thaksin, and the urban middle classes who were fed up with his authoritarian measures, including his control over the media and use of money politics to give himself a huge majority in the past elections, especially in rural areas. The army then stepped in, sensing correctly perhaps that a coup will not be unpopular. Although Thailand has gone some distance on the road to democracy, there was a tipping point at which political instability and threat to the national economy could generate public tolerance for a coup.

The economic fallout of the coup could be serious for Thailand, at least in the short term, but there is little risk of this turning into a regional economic crisis as happened in 1997, a crisis which had also originated in Thailand with the fall of the Thai currency. There are important differences between the two situations. The current crisis is brought about by internal political developments in Thailand, not by international currency speculators. And the region has more or less recovered from the 1997 crisis. In the long term, the end of the political uncertainty could help Thailand8217;s economic prospects.

But it all depends on how the Thai coup leaders manage the transition to a new government through elections. Thailand8217;s party system, though faction-ridden, can put forward an alternative coalition without too much difficulty. But a major uncertainty would be if elections are held and Thaksin or his party is returned to power again, as his populist policies would still have a huge following in the rural areas. Another uncertain factor is how this affects the perception of the king8217;s role. There may be a growing sense that the army would not have moved without the king8217;s tacit understanding, if not outright approval. If the coup in any way undermines the institution of the monarchy, Thailand could be headed for big trouble.

Moreover, the coup is a major setback to democratisation in Southeast Asia. It says a lot about the fragility of Asean8217;s new democracies. It was not long ago that many thought a military coup would be unthinkable in Thailand and more generally in Southeast Asia. The end of the Cold War and the growing backing for democratic transitions from Western countries fuelled such optimism, and most important, the downfall of the Suharto regime in the wake of the 1997 economic crisis. Southeast Asia seemed to be enjoying a democratic moment.

If it is Thailand today, which country is next? Will it be Philippines, where there have already been plenty of signs of military restiveness? Will it be Indonesia? Will the coup encourage militaries in other countries who have not reconciled to democratic transitions in their homeland and who may be tempted to exploit public disenchantment caused by corruption, inefficiency and uncertainty under democratic rule? The region will be haunted by these uncertainties. The coup will please critics of democracy who argue that such an 8216;alien8217; and 8216;Western8217; form of government is not suited to local conditions. Moreover, it confirms an unfortunate perception that people8217;s power or military power remains a plausible way of bringing about political change in Southeast Asia, that these democracies have not learnt how to manage transition from corrupt and inefficient regimes through legitimate elections.

These critics can point to the corruption, instability and insecurity that have marked Thailand in recent years as an indictment of democracy as a system of government. These are of course self-serving arguments by people who are apologists for authoritarian rule, but the coup will give them new ammunition. This comes at a time when Western countries themselves have undermined the cause of democracy by supporting authoritarian governments who are on the right side of the war on terror example, Pakistan8217;s Musharraf, or by limiting civil liberties in their own countries in the name of fighting terror.

Story continues below this ad

The Thai coup also poses a major challenge to Asean, which is rethinking its approach to state sovereignty and developing new means to safeguard regional stability. Asean8217;s evolving plan of action for a 8220;security community8221; endorses democracy as a desirable form of government. It will seriously test the Asean principle that its members do not recognise any government that has come into power through 8220;unconstitutional8221; means. A coup certainly falls in that category, no matter what is its justification.

It will be interesting to see how Asean countries respond to the coup, whether they will continue to recognise Thaksin, or come around to accepting the leaders of the coup 8212; and their chosen political representatives by finding some excuse that this was not really an unconstitutional ouster of a legitimate government, but unavoidable action against one that had lost its legitimacy, especially after the last elections called by Thaksin were seen as flawed and hence boycotted by the opposition. If the coup leaders succeed in restoring order promptly and if Thaksin gives up on his bid to reclaim his position as prime minister, then the latter scenario is more likely. In any case Asean8217;s task of devising new rules and mechanisms for ensuring regional political stability has become much more demanding after the coup in Thailand.

The writer, deputy director of Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, writes a regular column for The Indian Express