Making it easier for the enemy

India's military response to terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir must be to Pakistan's liking. By continuing with its low intensity warfare, P...

India8217;s military response to terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir must be to Pakistan8217;s liking. By continuing with its low intensity warfare, Pakistan has managed to draw more and more of the Indian Army troops into the Valley. As a result, the training schedules of troops and their deployment patterns have been thrown out of gear. Whether our Army top brass admit or not, all this is bound to have a debilitating effect on the Army8217;s capability to wage a full-fledged conventional war, should the occasion arise.

Of course, there are many conformists who argue that in our security environment, chances of a full-fledged war can be ruled out, particularly now that both India and Pakistan have acquired the nuclear capability. But they overlook the fact that in a volatile region such as ours, it does not take long for any situation to reach a flash point. Except for 1971, there was very little warning time preceding the wars with China and Pakistan.

More recently, it has taken less than 15 days for the troops of Iranand the Taliban to lock horns over Afghanistan. Thus, for any country to commit a sizable part of its troops in a low intensity conflict as in Kashmir with local populace sneering at them would be ill-advised. Needless to say, it would be just what the military planners in Rawalpindi would want.

Moreover, putting troops trained in specialised warfare in a grovelling war of attrition also mitigates against our aspired role in the Indian subcontinent. For years we have been building towards having greater Naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, deployment in the insurgency-affected spots for short periods could be excellent blooding8217; of troops, but when such a situation becomes a quagmire, it can demoralise the rank and file of the armed forces. Of course, certain recent decisions of the Union Defence Minister, Ge-orge Fernandes, have come as a silver lining and will prevent such a disposition taking root.

It is in this light that the latest decision to move a few armoured formations into theValley without their equipment appears shortsighted. Interestingly, various armoured units are vying with each other to go to the Valley since it would provide the much needed boost to the careers of their officers and jawans by way of medals, foreign postings, honorary ranks etc. But none of this should be the deciding factor for the type of troops to be inducted in any theatre of activity.

Since armour is the Army8217;s key weapon in a major conflagration, it should be inducted to combat terrorism only if our infantry formations are stripped to the bare or if the situation requires the induction of heavier weaponry. In the present scenario, none of this is warranted. Those who argue that it is unfair to make only the infantrymen fight terrorism forget that each arm has its role; if an operation requires a foot-soldier, a tank-man cannot substitute him 8211; just as an infantry action cannot make up for an armoured thrust. And using armoured formations without th-eir main equipment, even for short periods, for theintended road clearance roles in Jamp;K defies military prudence.

Earlier, the decision to raise Rashtriya Rifles was also one such decision, which was taken without proper assessment of the situation. To make matters worse, the Army had to pay for these formations, contrary to the initial understanding, resulting in a major financial drag on the already scarce resources of the armed forces. It is time to make an honest appraisal of the role and performance of the RR formations.

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All this is not to suggest that the Army should pull out and allow the Valley to burn. Army is the nation8217;s last resort and should be used as one and not as a police force. The situation warrants a proper strategy, which would prevent slow bleeding8217; of our armed forces without requisite gains.The closest we came to resolving the Kashmir issue on our terms was in 1987-88. Whether by design or accident, the then Army Chief, General K. Sundarji, brought about a situation, wherein chances of clinching the Kashmir issue once and for all,was perhaps plausible. As a part of the exercises Brass Tacks and Trident, the strike formations had been moved into a menacing mode in the Western Theatre. At that time, a few of Pakistan8217;s armoured and mechanised columns were in faraway Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile, the effective deterrent against sudden Chinese intervention too was in place. In fact even some mechanised columns were strategically placed in Ladakh. Also, the advantage on the Siachen Glacier had been achieved earlier, which could facilitate a possible breakthrough in the Shia-majority Northern Areas which are in Pakistan8217;s control.

Significantly, at that time Pakistan8217;s military leadership was still embroiled in its political mess and that country was some time away from an effective nuclear deterrent. Parts of Sind had begun to flare-up. Also the Taliban militia was yet to achieve its breakthrough in Afghanistan. Since Pakistan8217;s ominous designs had yet to fructify, a political initiative in the Valley could come off. However, ourpolitical leadership then was too naive and lacked the foresight to take any momentous decision and instead of grabbing the opportunity chose to go on the defensive.

Now the situation has changed to our disadvantage. The foreign mercenaries have upped the ante and the sense of alienation among the locals in the Valley has increased manifold. Then there is an effective nuclear deterrent for all to see. All this warrants a fresh and studied political, diplomatic and possible military response. Merely raising Army troop levels in the Valley is a short-term measure with long-term ramifications.