Learning to live with Ghauri

Appreciations on defensive scenarios are evolved by matching enemy capability with own defences. Against the capability of the Ghauri we have, at present, no known defences. We have no system that could warn us about an incoming SSM strike and wehave no anti-ballistic weapon system to counter the missile. Hence, one would recommend the acquisition of over-the-horizon radars and Airborne Early Warning planes. For defence in the likely target area, one would need an anti-ballistic missile ABM. In the Gulf War the US used the Patriot ABMs to shoot down the Iraqi Scud SSMs. But, post-war studies doubt the efficacy of this ABM. However, if tasked, Abdul Kalam and his team would surely be able to design and produce our own indigenous and effective ABM. It is thus a fallacy to say that the Ghauri can be countered by the Prithvi or the Agni SSMs.

A basic military tenet is 8220;offensive action8221;. It would be logical, therefore, that at the commencement of hostilities, or in pre-emptive action, the Ghauri, its installations and infrastructure be made unusable.

To do so, first of all there has to be continuous intelligence on the location, movement and the installation of the SSMs along with its related command and control links and organisation. Whetherthe information is obtained by ground intelligence, by satellite information or by MiG 25 reconnaissance, is not material. What is most vital is that there should be real time intelligence with Air HQ. Concurrently, the Indian Air Force will have to draw up its strike plans to take out the SSMs. This target system could be engaged by manned aircraft, such as the Mirage 2000 firing its laser guided bombs as displayed at Pokharan last month, or by the Prithvi or Agni, or by a coordinated combination attack with all these weapons.

However, vis a vis Pakistan, another perspective needs to be examined. In the subcontinent, India developed SSMs first, i.e. the Prithvi and the Agni.

Whether these missiles were for furthering technological development in our country or as a response to the Chinese military build-up, the inductions would be of serious security concerns for the smaller neighbour, which in Pakistani eyes, has already been dismembered once by a hegamonistic adversary. The same applies to the nuclearweapons situation. We exploded a device in 1974, and maybe justifiably, Pakistan had to pursue a path towards acquiring their own nuclear counter.

It is not material as to how Pakistan went about obtaining the expertise for making the Ghauri. And, no amount of political and media whining by us and complaining to the rest of the world can take away what they already have.

Or, for that matter, no amount of pressure from any country can turn the clock back in regard to our own technological capabilities.Meanwhile, we need to take considered steps for countering the military capacity of our long-term adversary, China. For the first time, the government is using words that earlier were anathema to it. Prime Minister Gujral had said that we need deterrence8217; to prevent attack. However, for deterrence to work, it has to have the following ingredients. Deterrent weapons such as the Agni must be in place and secure. They must be visible, i.e. known to all adversaries, and there has to be an appropriateinfrastructure for their use including mechanisms for control by the country8217;s chief executive.

Maybe, the long awaited national security council will address these issues.

The writer is a retired Air Vice-Marshal