Joint adventure

Many bureaucrats, serving or retired, seldom meet a new idea they like. This condition is more pronounced within foreign offices and intelligence agencies. Not surprisingly many retired diplomats and espiocrats have reacted with some venom against the proposal of an 8220;institutional mechanism8221; to initiate Indo-Pakistan cooperation on counter terrorism. The reaction to such a simple measure seems way over the top. After all, no one can deny that the success of India8217;s war on terrorism depends largely on Pakistan8217;s willingness to cooperate. How can any one trash a mechanism that allows the intelligence agencies from the two sides to exchange information, seek clarifications and mutual assistance?

Is something more at play? As in the over-anxious national debate on civilian nuclear cooperation with the US, are retired 8220;experts8221; seeking a pivotal role on a major public policy issue? Notwithstanding their claims to expertise, no prime minister can afford to cede political authority over national security decision-making. By hosting and providing assurances to protesting ex-scientists of the Department of Atomic Energy, did Dr Singh send a signal that suggested narrow departmental visions could successfully interrogate broad national and political goals? As he embarks on a potentially historic diplomatic initiative towards Pakistan, Dr Singh should make it abundantly clear that former national security bureaucrats have no veto over India8217;s Pakistan policy.

As in the nuclear deal with the US where it took considered political risks, a large and self-confident country like India should be prepared to innovate on key national security issues. Just as India would walk out of a nuclear deal that violates the spirit of the original understanding with the US, there is no reason why India can8217;t wait to assess the joint mechanism with Pakistan on the basis of its future performance. The proposed initiative can only increase the political burden on Pakistan to demonstrate its sincerity in ending cross-border terrorism. To dismiss the prospects for counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan, even before it starts, reflects the melancholic group-think within the national security establishment. Diplomatic experimentation with Pakistan, with all the attendant risks, is better than a sterile national consensus on a 8220;do-nothing8221; policy.