Inquiring inquiries

Justice Srikrishna8217;s unhappiness with the cavalier treatment meted out to his detailed and meticulous report on the Bombay riots is entirely understandable. Many, including this newspaper, have argued that it is only credible action on the findings of the Srikrishna Report that would bring some closure to a horrific chapter in India8217;s history. We would, however, find it difficult to agree with the justice8217;s argument that the executive must be prevented through some institutional mechanism from rejecting the report of an inquiry commission.

There can be no denying that inquiry commissions in this country have invariably been instituted in lieu of executive action, rather than as an impetus for it. The time-honoured response of governments who find themselves in a spot over a raging riot or a public outcry over some volatile issue is to institute a commission of inquiry and gain some respite before the healing properties of public amnesia are allowed to work. But this cynical use to which commissions have been put cannot justify the measure that Justice Srikrishna has envisaged. Inquiry commissions, under Indian law, are meant essentially to conduct exercises in fact-finding for an important public purpose. Imagine the runabout that would have been entailed if mandatory executive action was to be taken on the findings of the Mukherjee Commission on Subhas Chandra Bose8217;s demise. After seven years of labour, the Commission came to the conclusion that Bose was indeed, in all likelihood, dead but that he had not died in the 1945 air crash. There have been instances where inquiries have been instituted for purely political reasons. Many believe that the U.C. Banerjee Commission to investigate the cause of the fire in S-6 of the Sabarmati Express was set up by the rail ministry for the limited purpose of winning the rail minister, Lalu Prasad Yadav, an important assembly election.

All this is not to undermine the importance of inquiry commissions set up for credible purposes. They serve the public function of flagging serious lacunae in governance and justice delivery. Their findings need to be taken with the utmost seriousness by the executive. But they cannot function like the executive.