India146;s vision void

The looming problems could have been avoided had the Congress-led coalition government shown the self-belief and self-confidence to articulate an expansive strategic vision, an 8220;Indian Monroe Doctrine8221;, to mark out an Indian 8220;sphere of responsibility8221; to match the country8217;s legitimate great power ambitions. New Delhi could have exhumed the idea of 8220;distant defence8221; popularised by Lord Minto, Governor-General of British India in the 1810s, a concept encompassing the Indian Ocean basin, the Gulf, the Central Asian Republics and the South East Asian littoral inclusive of Vietnam.

New Delhi could have drawn up a plan, based on the enormous goodwill the Iraqi people have for India, to normalise Iraq minus the US presence and elsewhere, for it to act as a bridge between Iran and Israel/US and between Israel and Palestine. Such attractive options would have created enduring leverage for India in Washington. But, absent an Indian grand strategy or game plan or an alternative design for regional and Asian order, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will be left exploring with President George W. Bush ways to fit India into the American scheme of things. It is an Indian vision void Washington will exploit. Unlike New Delhi, US has a road-map. It means to emulate the erstwhile Soviet Union and use the sale of military hardware and, especially, the follow-on logistics support requirement to influence Indian politico-military policy 8212; an approach helped by New Delhi8217;s penchant for judging a western country8217;s bonafides by its willingness to sell sophisticated armaments and transfer the latest technology.

The problem the US government is wrestling with is: how to cater to India8217;s conceit as a military and scientific power without augmenting Indian military capabilities to a point where it can upset the 8220;balance8221; Washington deems necessary to maintain peace and stability in the subcontinent and threaten American strategic interests in the extended region.

The solution the US government has alighted on and reflected in the agreement Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed in Washington is to offer pleasing rhetoric and showy combat aircraft 8212; F-16 with 8220;co-production8221;, F-18 probably without it 8212; that are in no way superior to planes already in service with the Indian Air Force, and ballistic missile defence BMD systems of questionable worth, in lieu of the advanced 8220;dual use8221; technologies vaguely promised by the Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership that could enhance India8217;s strategic military prowess and which, therefore, the US is reluctant to part with. A 8220;Procurement and Production Group8221; has been constituted to facilitate these offers, which are 8220;safe8221; because other than yanking the supply leash, the US Congress can be prompted at any time to cut-off the sale/transfer deals mid-stride.

The defence accord also tempts India with future augmentation of the ineffective but inordinately expensive terminal phase intercept system Patriot PAC-2/PAC-3 or Arrow-2 8212; should India be conned into buying it 8212; with the boost-phase and deep space intercept wherewithal once it is developed. This hardware too, like the Patriot/Arrow, will have to plug into the global American sensor complex and thereby formalise India8217;s dependency status. If the Patriot is useless, this other stuff remains in the realm of science fiction and unlikely to materialise for several decades and, when ready, to bring down more than a score of incoming missiles! Meaning, an adversary can easily defeat the proposed system purchased for thousands of crores of rupees by saturating it with missiles costing between Rs 80 lakh and Rs 2 crore each! Indeed, anticipating India8217;s acquisition Pakistan has already constituted its Missile Groups, North and South, in such a way as to undermine any meaningful Indian BMD architecture.

Further, measures to prevent nuclear proliferation, protect sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean basin, cooperate in disaster relief, and to engage in multilateral defence cooperation, mentioned in the agreement are missions the Indian armed forces have been performing for many years now, and do not amount to enlargement of India8217;s activities.

Hans Blix, the former International Atomic Energy Agency Chief, has faulted the US for relying on 8220;faith-based8221; intelligence regarding the non-existent WMD in Iraq rather than on 8220;critical analysis8221;. The Manmohan Singh government8217;s national security and science and technology policies seem to be similarly flawed, based as they seem to be on faith in the US8217;s benign intentions when a more skeptical attitude is merited.

How seriously should one take Washington8217;s policy of assisting India to become a 8220;major8221; power when US maintains pressure on New Delhi to keep its deterrent small and inert and vigorously opposes India8217;s entry into the Security Council with veto rights? It does not help to argue that such doubts are redolent of 8220;Cold War thinking8221; when it is obvious national interest alone animates US policy, as it should Indian policy.

There is just too much at stake for New Delhi to agree to initiatives that weaken India8217;s sovereignty and hollow out its national security prerogatives. The US involvement in the critical defence and energy fields is best kept at a minimum level until such time as an equitable relationship can accrue based on mutual trust generated by years of intensive politico-military cooperation and evidence of a more reasonable American stance on Indian nuclear forces and India8217;s place in the emerging international order. This will require modest steps informed by caution, not a series of sprints into a potential minefield.

Karnad is author of 8216;Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security8217;